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SUMMARY
It is now six years since a devastating financial and economic crisis rocked the global economy.
Supported strongly by the G20 process, international regulators led by the Financial Stability Board
have been working hard ever since to develop new regulatory standards designed to prevent a
recurrence of these events. These international standards are intended to provide guidance for the
drawing up of national legislation and regulation, and have already had a pervasive influence
around the world.  
This paper surveys recent international developments concerning the prudential regulation of
financial institutions: banks, the shadow banking system and insurance companies. It concludes
that, while substantial progress has been made, the global economy nevertheless remains
vulnerable to possible future financial instability. This possibility reflects three sets of concerns.
First, measures taken to manage the crisis to date have actually made the prevention of future
crises more difficult. Second, the continuing active debate over virtually every aspect of the new
regulatory guidelines indicates that the analytical foundations of what is being proposed remain
highly contestable. Third, implementation of the new proposals could suffer from different practices
across regions.  
Looking forward, the financial sector will undoubtedly continue to innovate in response to
competitive pressures and in an attempt to circumvent whatever regulations do come into effect. If
we view the financial sector as a complex adaptive system, continuous innovation would only be
expected. This perspective also provides a number of insights as to how regulators should respond
in turn. Not least, it suggests that attempts to reduce complexity would not be misguided and that
complex behaviour need not necessarily be accompanied by still more complex regulation.
Removing impediments to more effective self discipline and market discipline in the financial sector
would also seem recommended. 
† Without assigning any responsibility for remaining shortcomings, my thanks to Andrew Wong,
Claudio Borio and Karl Cordewener for helpful comments.
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RÉSUMÉ
Il y a de cela six ans maintenant, une crise financière et économique dévastatrice secouait la planète. 
Largement soutenus par le processus du G20, les organismes internationaux de réglementation dirigés 
par le Conseil de stabilité financière ont travaillé dur, depuis, pour mettre au point de nouvelles normes 
réglementaires visant à empêcher que de tels événements ne se reproduisent. Ces normes internationales 
ont pour fonction de guider la mise en place de lois et de règlements nationaux et déjà, elles ont une 
forte influence partout dans le monde.
Cet article propose un survol des récents développements internationaux concernant les règles de 
prudence des institutions financières : les banques, le système bancaire parallèle et les compagnies 
d’assurance. Il conclut qu’en dépit des progrès substantiels réalisés, l’économie internationale ne demeure 
pas moins vulnérable à une instabilité financière potentielle dans l’avenir. Cette possibilité donne lieu à 
trois groupes de préoccupations. Premièrement, les mesures adoptées à ce jour pour gérer la crise ont 
en fait rendu la prévention des crises futures plus difficile. Deuxièmement, le débat ininterrompu sur 
chaque aspect, ou presque, des nouvelles lignes directrices en matière de réglementation indique que 
les fondements analytiques des mesures proposées demeurent largement contestables. Troisièmement, 
la mise en œuvre des nouvelles propositions pourrait pâtir des différences entre les pratiques mises en 
place dans chaque région.
Dans l’avenir, le secteur financier continuera certainement d’innover pour répondre aux pressions 
concurrentielles et pour contourner n’importe quelle réglementation susceptible d’entrer en vigueur. 
Si nous considérons le secteur financier comme un système complexe qui sait s’adapter, il est à prévoir 
qu’il innovera en permanence. Cette approche propose, dans la foulée, certaines pistes de réflexion 
sur la façon dont les organes de réglementation devraient réagir à leur tour. Selon l’une d’elles, et 
non la moindre, il serait judicieux d’adopter des moyens pour réduire la complexité des mesures; les 
comportements complexes ne doivent pas nécessairement s’accompagner d’une réglementation encore 
plus sibylline. Il serait également recommandé d’éliminer les freins à l’autodiscipline et à la discipline de 
marché dans le secteur financier.
† 
Sans imputer à quiconque la responsabilité de lacunes potentielles dans cet article, je souhaite remercier Andrew Wong, Claudio 
Borio et Karl Cordewener pour leurs commentaires utiles.
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides an overview of recent international developments affecting the prudential
regulation of financial institutions. The purpose is to see if there are any lessons that might be
drawn for Canadian regulators. A skeptic might suggest three reasons for doubting the
usefulness of this exercise. First, financial regulation is by no means a science. This implies that
best practice for different countries might well be different. Second, the international review of
regulatory practice, sparked by the financial crisis that began in 2007, is still very much a work
in progress. This might imply that it is too early to draw lessons for Canadian regulation. Third,
since the Canadian financial sector had such a “good” crisis, this might imply that Canadian
regulators have little to learn from others. 
The counter-argument to the first point is that countries might well differ in some respects, but
the underlying analytical issues and problems to be faced have definite similarities. As for the
second point, regulation is constantly evolving. To wait for the process to end would be to wait
forever. As for the apparent relative strength of Canadian financial regulation, it might be that
the Canadian financial sector has benefited as much from luck as from judgment. Indeed, some
worry that the Canadian financial sector has not yet been tested by a credit-fuelled “boom and
bust” similar to those that have recently affected many other countries.1 Recent developments in
the housing sector in Canada imply that such a test might yet be forthcoming. In sum, this paper
might still have some potential to be useful.
The objective sought by, and the rationale for, prudential regulation
It has always been recognized that the financial sector has vital functions: facilitating payments,
providing liquidity, pooling savings and risk-sharing, and credit intermediation between savers
and investors. These functions (“financial stability”) contribute materially to our economic well-
being. Similarly, their absence (“financial instability”) imposes great costs. The objective of
prudential financial regulation is to ensure that these vital functions are maintained.
The traditional approach of prudential regulators has been to focus on the safety and soundness
of individual financial institutions; a bottom-up perspective to the working of the system as a
whole. In practice, this approach remains dominant. However, in response to recurring financial
crises over recent decades,2 a top down approach to prudential regulation (focused on “systemic
stability”) has also begun to attract attention. While “systemic stability” has numerous  
1 The most recent OECD economic surveys for Canada, the Nordic countries, Australia and many other countries
indicate worryingly high household-debt ratios and often record high property prices. In each case, following the onset
of the crisis, banks continued to grant mortgage loans in large volumes in response to strong demand spurred by low
global interest rates. The share of residential mortgages in total Canadian dollar assets of Canadian banks rose from 35
per cent in 2007 to 45 percent by the end of 2011. See: OECD, “Economic Survey of Canada,” Economic and
Development Review Committee, April 2012.
2 M. Bordo et al. (“Financial Crises: Lessons from the Last 150 Years,” Economic Policy (April 2001)) document the
increase in financial crises in recent decades and link them to the trend to deregulation of the financial system. A.
Admati and M. Hellwig (The Banker’s New Clothes, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013)) suggest,
rather, that rising macroeconomic volatility from the 1970s onward was largely to blame. Perhaps both causes, and
their interactions, were in play.
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definitions,3 a new focus on systemic properties would recognize that the financial system is a
complex adaptive system, with many interdependencies among agents who are constantly
responding to the activities of other agents.4 Such systems, while generally highly efficient, can
sometimes break down catastrophically. Since all complex adaptive systems seem to share
basic properties,5 a first lesson might well be that financial regulators could learn significantly
from those charged with regulating other complex systems6 with a view to maintaining their
stability.
If it is broadly agreed that the objective sought is to avoid “financial instability,” there is less
agreement on the role of prudential regulation in achieving such an objective. Perhaps the
dominant view is that regulation is required to offset market failures7 of various sorts: the
failure of people operating in the system to appreciate the externalities associated with their
behaviour, excessive short-termism and ignoring of risks, the influence of safety nets and moral
hazard, etc. Without regulation, these market failures (or others) would eventually result in
some degree of financial instability and associated output losses. 
At the same time, regulation also has downsides. First, the costs implicit in the regulations
chosen — lower static and dynamic efficiency of the financial system — have to be less than
the expected costs of financial instability. Second, there is always the danger that regulation
creates distortions and further market failures leading to the “need” for still more regulation. In
effect, regulations increase the complexity of the financial system and the likelihood of
instability. Third, regulations that force many financial agents to behave in the same way can
easily exacerbate systemic problems. Finally, in complex adaptive systems, all policy actions
have unintended and potentially undesirable consequences.
3 For an overview of a number of different definitions, see: P. M. Liedtke, “The Lack of an Appropriate Definition of
Systemic Risk,” Insurance and Finance 6, the Geneva Association (July 6, 2010).
4 For a useful description, see: C. Taylor, “Macro prudential Regulation and Evolution: Looking at the Financial
System Through Darwin’s Glasses” (prepared for the Macro Prudential Regulatory Policies Conference sponsored by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the IMF, World Scientific Studies, Singapore, September 23–24, 2010).
5 These include: (1) the inevitability of crises, with magnitude and frequency being linked by a power law, (2) the
impossibility of forecasting, (3) the absence of any relationship between the trigger for a systemic breakdown and its
size, and (4) the inevitability of unforeseen consequences of all policy actions. See: P. Ball, Why Society is a
Complex Matter (Berlin: Springer, 2012); M. Buchanan, Ubiquity (New York: Crown Publishers, 2000); and E.D.
Beinhocker, The Origin of Wealth (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 2006) for popular introductions to
this literature.
6 Transportation, information and communication, forest management, food security and the spread of infectious
diseases immediately come to mind.
7 See: D. Llewellyn, “The Economic Rational for Financial Regulation,” Financial Services Authority, Occasional
Papers Series 1, April 1999; and S. Cecchetti, “The Future of Financial Intermediation and Regulation” (remarks
prepared for the Second Conference of the European System of Central Banks, Macro Prudential Research Network,
Frankfurt, October 30, 2012).
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3Partly in response to these perceived downsides of regulation, others have suggested that
market failures are better addressed at source.8 In particular, what laws, regulations or policies
might lead to market failures and could they be removed? A common suggestion is that much
more transparency about the functioning of financial institutions would go a long way to
improving market discipline. Others suggest that incentive systems that encourage imprudent
behaviour could be changed, thus encouraging more self-discipline. Restoring a sense of
“fiduciary responsibility” for client welfare, reducing pay incentives that encourage near-
sighted investment strategies, and stronger legal sanctions for imprudent risk-taking would all
help.9 Perhaps most importantly, removing features of the financial safety net would imply that
financial agents would no longer be able to gamble for huge gains, knowing that losses would
largely be borne by taxpayers.10 All of these measures to increase market discipline and self-
discipline would reduce the need for regulatory discipline. Perhaps, in the end, recourse to all
these approaches will be needed to achieve the objective of financial stability. Whether they
would collectively prove sufficient is another issue.
Changes in emphasis over the years
Going back to the beginning of the last century, there have been long swings in financial
regulatory practice, from less restrictive to more restrictive regimes and then back again to less
restrictive. The current crisis has been the catalyst for another swing to tighter regulation.
Underlying these swings has been fundamental changes in beliefs11 about how efficiently a
market-based financial system would manage itself. Similarly, these changing beliefs about the
efficiency of private markets also lie behind long swings in fashion about how best to conduct
monetary policy.12 The complementary nature of these regulatory- and monetary-regime
changes had important implications for the real economy in that reliance on market processes
encouraged credit booms that eventually turned to bust. This experience then provided the
motivation for the next regime change in turn.13
8 The origins of this way of thinking go back at least to the pre-war Austrian School. See: S. C. Littlechild, The
Fallacy of the Mixed Economy (London: Institute for Economic Affairs, 1976), for a short introduction. George
Benston and George Kaufman have also been pursuing this line of thought for many decades. For a recent set of
similar suggestions, see: Institute for Economic Affairs, “Financial Regulation: the Need for a Revolution,” Journal
of the Institute for Economic Affairs 32, 3 (October 2012).
9 Considering the magnitude of this latest crisis, it is remarkable how few financial agents have been prosecuted in the
advanced market economies. This stands in sharp contrast, for example, with the many prosecutions that followed the
Savings and Loan crisis in the United States. See: N. Ferguson, The Great Degeneration (London: Penguin Books,
2012): 75.
10 Mervyn King, then-governor of the Bank of England, gave priority to the safety-net issue to the point of calling
bankers’ bonuses a “distraction.” See: B. Chu, “EU Cap on Bankers’ Bonuses is Unhelpful Distraction says King,”
The Independent, March 7, 2013. For a further analysis of this safety net issue, see: W. R. White, “Are Changes in
Financial Structure Increasing the Role of Safety Nets?” Bank for International Settlements, 2004.
11 One is reminded of Keynes’ famous quote “The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood.”
12 W. White,  “Is Monetary Policy a Science? The Interaction of Theory and Practice Over the Last 50 Years,” in
SUERF: 50 years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, ed. Morten Balling and Ernest Gnan (Vienna:
Larcier, November 2013). 
13 See: Bordo et al., “Financial Crises.”
There was little regulation prior to the 1930s. However, the belief that banking excesses had
contributed to the Great Depression, especially in the United States, led to a significant
tightening of financial regulation. This tightening of regulation was also thought justified by
the introduction of deposit insurance in the U.S. in 1933. Whatever the cause, there were
subsequently far fewer bank failures and systemic crises in advanced market economies
through the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s than had been experienced in the pre-war period.
However, there can also be little doubt that this came at the cost of some static inefficiency and
a reduction in innovation in the financial sector as well.
With time, as the rising economic costs of the regulations themselves became better
appreciated, there was a gradual swing back to a more deregulated financial environment. This
swing was abetted by the growing belief, noted above, that some combination of self-interest
and market discipline would suffice to prevent imprudent behaviour. The trend to financial-
market liberalization began in North America in the 1960s, but proceeded only somewhat later
in Europe and Japan, with the 1986 “Big Bang” legislation in the United Kingdom being of
particular importance. The regulatory treatment of international capital flows also seems to
have had a similar set of cycles.14
Regulatory liberalization, along with technological developments, contributed to three
important structural developments which profoundly changed the financial landscape from the
1970s onwards. First, traditional “relationship” banking (on balance sheet) was increasingly
complemented by “transactional” banking (largely off balance sheet) based on securitization of
traditional bank assets financed through wholesale funding. A long chain of intermediaries thus
developed (the “shadow banking” system) to link ultimate borrowers and ultimate lenders.
Second, the financial system became increasingly globalized. Not only did gross international
capital flows increase enormously,15 but banks from the advanced market economies
increasingly established a local presence in other countries. Third, there was a significant
degree of consolidation, with large financial firms not only gaining relative share, but also
expanding the range of activities in which they were involved. 
These structural developments were initially welcomed as improvements to the efficiency of
the global financial system, though a few commentators did note important downsides.16 Some
worried that securitization and the spread of shadow banking was an inherently fragile business
model in that it depended on very short term financing of much longer-term assets.17 
14 Capital controls were accepted as an essential requirement for the proper functioning of the Bretton Woods system.
The doctrine of the “Impossible Trinity” held that a country could not have a fixed exchange rate, and an
autonomous monetary policy, given free (and highly elastic) international capital flows. Subsequently, controls were
gradually lifted, culminating in efforts made by the International Monetary Fund in the late 1990s to change its
Articles of Agreement to force countries to remove such controls. More recently, in light of the recent crisis, the
Fund has swung back to the conclusion that capital controls can, at times, serve a useful purpose. See: International
Monetary Fund, “The Liberalisation and Management of Capital Flows: an Institutional View,” November 14, 2012. 
15 For some documentation, see: M. Obstfeld, “Expanding Gross Asset Positions and the International Monetary
System” (prepared for the “Macroeconomic Challenges: The Decade Ahead” symposium, organized by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming , August 2010).
16 Successive annual reports of the Bank for International Settlements and associated research papers raised a number
of “unfashionable” concerns about all of these developments. 
17 T. Adrian and H.S. Shin, “Liquidity and Financial Cycles,” Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 256,
July 2008, among others.
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Globalization was also said to increase the likelihood of destabilizing international capital
flows, threatening borrowers but perhaps even lenders.18 Finally, consolidation raised the issues
of “too big to fail” or even “too big to save,” with all the associated concerns about ever
increasing moral hazard. Attesting to the validity of such concerns, there were also a rising
number of bank failures and other crises from the 1970s onwards. Among these were the
emerging-market debt crisis of the early 1980s, banking crises in the Nordic countries and
Japan in the early 1990s, a severe financial crisis in South East Asia beginning in 1997, and the
events surrounding the failure of LTCM (an American firm) in 1998.
In eventual response to these developments, a number of central banks began to publish
financial stability reports, as did some supervisory authorities. The Financial Stability Forum
was established in 1998 and, shortly thereafter, it proposed a set of 12 “standards” to improve
the stability of the financial system. However, consistent with the then-current belief system,
these problems were not initially thought sufficient cause for a fundamental reassessment of
the costs and benefits of a liberalized financial sector in the largest advanced-market
economies (AMEs). The crises observed were largely in emerging-market economies (EMEs),
or in AMEs in the process of financial deregulation, and thus deemed “special.” It took the
severity of the financial and economic crisis beginning in 2007 to lead to a more fundamental
re-evaluation. 
This is not to say that all of the developments between the 1960s and 2007 were moving in a
liberalizing direction. While this was generally the case at the national level, at the
international level there was increasing concern about the growing role of internationally active
banks and the need for a “level playing field.” The catalyst for these concerns was the
international expansion of Japanese banks in the 1980s. This provided a significant threat to
American and other western banks, which had been weakened by bad loans made to EMEs in
an attempt to “recycle petrol dollars” after the oil crises of the 1970s.19
The Basel Accord of 1988 (now known as Basel l) was the initial response to these concerns.
Promulgated by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, and subsequently ratified by
national legislators, the Basel Accord was an early example of international “soft law” now
seen on a much wider scale.20 Basel l also adopted the concept of risk–weighted capital
requirements, which some jurisdictions had already introduced. Assets of banks were allocated
into “buckets,” with different capital requirements imposed depending on the relative riskiness
of the assets concerned. As for the overall level of capital demanded, there was no attempt
made either to assess why capital was needed or its optimal level.21 Rather, to aid compliance,
the level set was designed to be only slightly higher than what the banks were already holding.
18 For a review of the literature motivated by the Asian crisis, see: W. R. White, “Recent Initiatives to Improve the
Regulation and Supervision of Private Capital Flows,” Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 92, 2000.
More recently, see: V. Bruno and H.S. Shin, “Global Factors in Capital Flows and Credit Growth” VoxEu.org, June
11, 2013.
19 W. L. Silber (Volcker (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012)) provides a fascinating description of these developments
and the particular role played by Paul Volcker
20
“Soft law” does not have the force of an international treaty. Rather it refers to international agreements — generally
brokered by committees made up of national experts — that have subsequently to be given the power of law by
national legislation.
21 See: C. A. E. Goodhart, “The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision”. p195.
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As the number of bank failures and economic and financial crises continued to rise, the Basel
committee began work on a significant refinement of Basel l, now known as Basel ll. It was
designed, not just to ensure a level playing field, but also to make the capital requirements
much more sensitive to risk with a view to reducing regulatory arbitrage. The agreement
fundamentally rested on three reinforcing “pillars.” The first pillar set out required capital
holdings, and set out various ways in which these capital requirements could be calculated.22
In effect, this was both an appeal to self-discipline to control risk-taking (“skin in the game”)
and the application of a regulatory rule. The second pillar laid out understandings about
supervisory oversight and the scope for judgment, a second source of discipline. The third
pillar had to do with transparency and reporting, with a view to the market exercising more
discipline. It should be noted that the development of Solvency ll standards for insurance
companies in Europe also rests on three similar pillars but, as will be discussed below, there
are in fact significant differences in the regulatory regimes proposed for banks and insurance
companies.
Even before the promulgation of Basel ll, a number of critics23 had suggested that these
measures might in fact increase rather than decrease financial instability. One important reason
was that the “risk weights,” while distinguishing properly between more and less risky assets at
a moment in time, might also fall all at the same time in cyclical upswings and rise all together
in cyclical downswings. This would increase the inherent tendency to “procyclicality” in
lending practices (explained in more detail below). Moreover, the emphasis in Basel ll
continued to be on improving the safety and resilience of individual banks, rather than the
behaviour of the system as a whole. Finally, and a still broader failing, stated concerns about
financial stability were not always matched by commensurate and concrete action. 
For better or worse, the ostensibly tougher Basel ll regulatory standards had not generally been
implemented when the crisis broke in 2007. However, one important exception was that
investment banks in the U.S. were allowed by the SEC, from 2004 onwards, to use Basel ll risk
weights to calculate their capital requirements. As a result, their required capital plummeted
and they subsequently increased their leverage in order to absorb all the capital they actually
had. Adrian and Shin24 as well as Admati and Hellwig,25 among others, contend that increased
leverage made a material contribution to much of the financial mayhem that followed.
The economic and financial crisis that began in 2007 had a significant effect on regulatory
thinking. Two developments were particularly important. First, the idea that self-interest and
market discipline would prevent imprudent behaviour seemed clearly rejected by the facts.
There was a need for tougher regulation. Second, there was further support for the belief that
the system as a whole could be vulnerable even if the individual parts appeared strong. The  
22 The most important distinction is between the standard and advanced methodologies. The former relies more on
external ratings to determine credit quality, whereas the latter allows for the greater use of internally developed
models. There would be a presumption that more granular and sophisticated internal models would lower the
assessed need for capital, but such models would also be expensive to set up and run.
23 C. A. E. Goodhart, “An Academic Response”; and a variety of publications authored by Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) staff. For example, see: C. Borio, “Towards a Macroprudential Framework for Financial
Supervision and Regulation,” Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 128, February 2003.
24 Adrian and Shin, “Liquidity and Financial Cycles.”
25 Admati and Hellwig, The Banker’s New Clothes.
6
suddenness of the drying up of the inter-bank market and the unexpected collapse of Lehman
Brothers both pointed to systemic causes (both often described as “Minsky moments”) and
contributed to this intellectual change. These two new insights provide the jumping-off point
for the rest of this paper, which tries to evaluate which regulatory initiatives might best help
achieve the objective of “financial stability” described above. In practice, these post-crisis
initiatives seem to have been driven much more by the need for tighter regulations than the
need to address systemic issues. 
It is finally worth noting the actions undertaken by regulators (in association with governments
and central banks) to manage the crisis as it unfolded. Virtually everywhere, the official sector
turned to some combination of forbearance, public injection of funds to troubled institutions,
massive extension of “safety net” provisions (deposit insurance and senior credits) and the use
of takeovers and mergers and acquisitions to deal with seriously troubled institutions. These
measures seemed to be necessary to prevent the crisis from spreading with even more
devastating effects. However, there also seems little doubt that these measures have made the
challenge of preventing future crises much harder. All of these support measures (“bail out”
rather than “bail in”) have generated moral hazard and a further erosion of both internal and
market discipline. Further, many institutions are now even bigger and more complex (and thus
interdependent) than they were before, implying a clear worsening of the “too big to fail”
problem during the crisis. Haldane suggests26 that the implicit government subsidy to large
banks has increased markedly since the crisis began. Something similar can also be said about
many financial markets, which are now more concentrated than before. In sum, future systemic
risks in the financial sector have grown significantly as a result of recent policy actions.
Two other issues pertaining to regulatory actions in the post-crisis period are both important
and controversial. The first has to do with something that did not happen, and perhaps should
have. The second has to do with something that did happen, and perhaps should not have.
What has not happened in any major regulatory jurisdiction has been a comprehensive
approach to writing off troubled loans and forcing lending institutions into bankruptcy. In
effect, most affected countries (with the U.S. being somewhat of an exception) have chosen a
Japanese, rather than a Nordic approach, to resolving the problem of bad credit.27 What has
happened is that the regulators moved into crisis-prevention mode well before the problems
associated with this current crisis had been fully resolved. Not only have regulators everywhere
called for a major increase in capital requirements, but national regulators have also been
encouraging their financial institutions to retreat behind national borders. Whether or not this
26 A. Haldane, “Have We Solved ‘Too Big to Fail’?” VoxEu.org, December 18, 2003. He notes that, prior to the crisis,
the large banks classified as SIFIs (systematically important financial institutions) received a one-notch upgrade from
rating agencies on the assumption of state support. Since then, the upgrade has risen to three notches.
27 For an excellent description of these two approaches, see: C. Borio, B. Vale and G. von Peter, “Resolving the
Financial Crisis: Are We Heeding the Lessons from the Nordics?” Bank for International Settlements Working Paper
311, June 2010. The Japanese approach was based on the assumption that the losses were small enough that the
banking system and the country could grow out of them. This was also the tactic followed by the U.S. in response to
the banking losses associated with the emerging-market debt crisis of the 1980s. It worked in the U.S. case, but not
in the Japanese case. The fundamental problem is that unrecognized bad loans may inhibit lending to such a point
that they prevent the needed economic growth from actually happening. The Nordic approach recognized more
clearly the downside risks of this approach, and opted for a more rapid and brutal restructuring. It led to a deeper
recession, but one that was soon over. 
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might threaten the global recovery and the very concept of “financial globalization” going
forward28 is discussed further below. The only point to be made here is that important decisions
have already been taken, in spite of the fact that the analytical support needed was never
anything more than “work in progress.”
Other influences on regulatory changes
In looking at what other countries or even international bodies do in the regulatory area, it is
important not to be naive. Regulatory changes are mostly driven by valid economic objectives
and the belief that regulatory changes can help achieve them. Nevertheless, other, less noble
motives often come into play as well.
First, in complex and unexpected circumstances, there seems to be a natural human tendency to
revert to earlier belief systems, whether appropriate or not.29 In Europe, for example,
disproportionate efforts have gone into regulating hedge funds and private-equity firms, even
though they played only a very limited role in the European financial crisis. Second, there
seems to be an equally human tendency to wish to find someone to blame for any undesirable
event. This can lead to angry and even punitive measures being taken, often legislated in haste.
Many would now consider the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to be an example of this, and many
worry similarly about the recently passed Dodd-Frank bill in the United States. Third, the
influence of lobbyists representing financial-sector interests has increased sharply in recent
years, and not just in the United States.30 The financial industry has access to large amounts of
money and is obviously prepared to use it in pursuit of its own interests. 
The lessons from this are twofold. First, do not assume that regulatory changes made elsewhere
have been done for the best of reasons. Second, one must be aware that similar malevolent
forces might also exist in Canada and their influence must therefore be guarded against.
REGULATING DIFFERENT KINDS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Prudential regulation has as its objectives the safety of individual institutions and the stability
of the financial system as a whole. Traditionally, such regulation has been primarily directed at
banks, and initiatives with respect to banks will be the primary focus of the next section below.
However, in recent years, a view has emerged that other institutions might also have the
potential to generate financial instability. This is considered in the following section, which
considers regulation pertaining to the many different types of financial institutions involved in  
28 In addition, the retreat into national jurisdictions in the eurozone threatens the very survival of the eurozone itself.
29 See: D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (Toronto: Doubleday, 2011).
30 See: N. Häring and N. Douglas, Economists and the Powerful (London: Anthem Press, 2012); S. Johnson “The Quiet
Coup,” The Atlantic, May 1, 2009; and J. R. Wedel, Shadow Elite (New York: Basic Books, 2009). M. Taibbi (“How
Wall Street Killed Financial Reform,” Rolling Stone, May 10, 2012) provides a useful taxonomy of “How Wall Street
Killed Financial Reform.” Measures noted include watering down the original act, stalling for time, utilizing many
loopholes, bullying the regulators, and appealing repeatedly to the courts. 
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the “shadow banking” system. Regulation pertaining to insurance companies and pension funds
will be dealt with separately in a subsequent section of this paper. To put the size of these
industries into some perspective, the Financial Stability Board31 has estimated the total assets
of the global banking industry at $130 trillion, the shadow-banking industry at $67 trillion, and
the combined assets of the insurance industry and pension funds at $43 trillion.
In addition to prudential regulation, most countries have regulations directed to consumer
protection. While these will not be addressed in this paper, this is not meant to deny that
unethical business practices can also contribute to financial and macroeconomic instability. The
rapid growth and subsequent collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market in the U.S. is a case in
point. Moreover, the reverse direction of causation is also extremely common, as pointed out
by Kindelberger and Aliber.32 Finally, it is worth noting that unethical behaviour can change
the climate of public opinion in favour of tighter prudential regulation as well.33 This may be
one welcome side-effect of the recent LIBOR rate-setting scandal and the revelation of massive
trading losses at JP Morgan34 incurred by the “London Whale.”
Financial instability has economic costs as described above. One way of looking at prudential
regulatory measures is that they are designed to reduce the expected losses35 arising from such
instability. This involves measures to reduce the probability of a default/crisis arising, as well
as regulatory measures to reduce the size of the losses incurred, should a default/crisis actually
happen. In this paper, an important distinction is made between the micro-prudential approach
and the macro-prudential approach to the prudential regulation of financial institutions.36
These different approaches imply that the same policy instruments can be used for different
purposes. Thus, many of the instruments that could be used for macro-prudential purposes
(e.g., time-varying capital requirements as described below) were originally introduced for
micro-prudential purposes. This historical legacy creates problems for institutional design
going forward. 
The micro-prudential approach to prudential regulation is the more traditional of the two. It
focuses on the health of individual institutions, essentially assuming that, if each institution is
healthy, the system will be healthy. Issues of interdependence are given little attention and risks
are taken as exogenous. This approach is essentially static in nature. It assumes that defaults
could occur at any time and the regulatory response should be to reduce the probability of this
happening. Indeed, most of the proposed measures in Basel lll are of this nature. 
31 Financial Stability Board,  “Consultative Document: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking,”
November 18, 2012.
32 C. P. Kindelberger and R. Z. Aliber, Manias, Panics and Crashes (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
Specifically, see Chapter 9 on “Frauds, Swindles and the Credit Cycle.” J. K. Galbraith famously referred to such
late- cycle fraudulent behavior as “the bezzle.”
33 S. Patterson, “How ‘Whale’ Shipwrecked Banks on Dodd Frank,” The Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2012.
34 Prior to this incident, JP Morgan was considered to be one of the world’s best-managed firms. If it could suffer such
losses, what might happen elsewhere?
35 The “expected loss” is defined as the product of the probability of default/crisis (PC) and the loss incurred should
there be such a default/crisis (LGC).
36 For an early discussion, see: Borio, “Towards a Macroprudential.”
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The macro-prudential approach to prudential regulation rather focuses on the stability of the
financial system as a whole, and has both a static (cross-sectional) and a dynamic (time-
varying) dimension. The former dimension recognizes the interdependencies in the financial
system and the diverse ways in which the actions of individual institutions can feed back on
the health of others. It recognizes the fact that “shared shocks” can be dangerous to the system,
even if all its components initially seem healthy. Banks that are “too big to fail” also need
special attention, as do particular forms of interdependency. This approach does not just focus
on reducing the probability of a crisis, but also reducing the size of the economic costs that
might be associated with such a crisis.
The macro-prudential approach also has a time dimension. This reflects the assumption that
expected losses are not constant, but change over time. This has largely to do with the inherent
“procyclicality” of the financial system. To be more specific, the appetite to take on risk, both
by lenders and borrowers, seems to be endogenous and tends to increase with the apparent
strength of the cyclical upturn. This “boom” process (generally driven by leverage, speculation
and rapid credit growth) frequently culminates in a costly “bust.” This process is now well
documented historically37 and is increasingly well understood analytically.38 Accordingly, it is
suggested that macro-prudential measures might be calibrated to lean against this process. The
question of whether monetary policy should also “lean” against a credit bubble also deserves
serious attention. This is discussed below. As a corollary, it should also be noted that, in
complex adaptive systems, identifying the specific time and character of turning points is
essentially impossible. 
Prudential regulation of banks
The approach taken below will be to allocate the prudential measures being currently discussed
at the international level into the two categories of initiatives defined above. In the case of
each, an attempt will be made to assess the reactions to these proposals. 
37 Two well-known references are: C. Reinhart and K. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial
Folly (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009); and O. Jorda, M. Schularick and A. M. Taylor, “When
Credit Bites Back: Business Cycles and Crises” (paper prepared for “Debt and Credit Growth and Crises”
conference, hosted by the World Bank and the Bank of Spain, Madrid, June 18–19, 2012).
38 For a recent overview of this literature, see: C. Borio, “The Financial Cycle and Macroeconomics: What Have We
Learnt?” Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 395, December 2012. Also: C. Borio and W. White,
“Whither Monetary and Financial Stability: The Implications of Evolving Policy Regimes” (prepared for “Monetary
Policy and Uncertainty: Adapting to a Changing Economy” symposium, organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 28–30, 2003). Note as well, that government policies also contribute to
the tendency to “procyclicality.” The fact that the shareholders of financial institutions have legally limited liability is
equivalent to saying that they have a “put” on the value of the firm with the strike price at zero. In effect, they have a
limited downside but an unlimited upside which encourages risk taking. Moreover, official safety-net measures
worsen this asymmetry. 
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MICRO-PRUDENTIAL INITIATIVES
In theory, individual financial institutions protect themselves against possible credit losses in
three ways. First, they take care to price the loan according to the riskiness of the loan. In a
diversified portfolio, occasional losses are offset by the extra revenues from other risky loans
that continue to be serviced. Second, when perceptions of risk shift, the lender makes loan-loss
provisions to cover this expected loss. Third, institutions hold capital to meet the challenges
posed by unexpected losses.
In practice, the regulatory regimes associated with the Basel process have commonly failed to
make these distinctions, implying that the analytical underpinnings of the Basel framework
could have serious shortcomings. At the least, regulators have failed to ensure that financial
institutions have recourse to all three safeguards. 
The pricing of risky loans has received surprisingly little attention.39 Indeed, the narrowing of
risk spreads between 2004 and 2007 (just before the crisis started) was generally interpreted by
regulators and central bankers as a positive sign for the future stability of the system.40
Moreover, diversification per se has not been seen as a high priority,41 even if this argument
has been used from time to time to support the existence of “universal” banks. Absent such
concerns about diversification, there has been a gradual drift upwards in the proportion of loans
against property in the banking systems of many countries. This is particularly worrisome
given how commonly property finds itself at the centre of “boom-bust” credit cycles.42
Further, excessive reliance might have been put on the low (and assumed constant) correlations
observed historically between returns on asset classes in assessing diversification. If those
correlations might be expected to rise significantly in crisis situations, then actual
diversification might prove to be much less. 
As for making provisions against expected losses, this has been resisted firmly for decades by
both Treasury officials and by the accounting profession. The former feared tax losses as bank
profits were reduced, while the latter feared that the introduction of “subjective” expectations
would allow the accounts to be manipulated. Better, they felt, to allow provisions only when
loans actually had gone bad or were about to (the “incurred loss” approach). However, this
approach might be about to change. Both the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)
and the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) announced in 2012 their desire to
move to an “expected loss” model, though both remain reluctant to embrace full “through-the-
cycle” loss experience. Further, technical differences in the FASB and IASB proposals still
need to be dealt with. The former prefers to recognize more losses up front, while the latter
continues to argue that this could discourage necessary lending. 
39 In the late 1980s, the Committee on the Global Financial System at the BIS set up a sub-committee, under the
chairmanship of a senior vice-president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to compare ex ante and ex post
assessments of risk at large financial firms. The identification of big differences would then have called into question
the risk-assessment procedures at the institutions involved. For various reasons, not least the unwillingness of
financial institutions to co-operate, this work was not pursued. 
40 As discussed further below, there seems to be a growing consensus that market-based indicators of increasing risks in
the system (such as the Vix index) systematically move in the wrong direction. 
41 In fact, the assumption underlying the calculation of the capital requirements is that each portfolio is perfectly diversified.
42 Commercial property prices are generally even more volatile than residential property prices. Looking forward, the
value of retail shops (bricks and mortar) might be under particular threat from online shopping. See: The Economist,
“The Emporium Strikes Back,” July 13-19, 2013. As online banking expands, something similar could affect the
property value of branch banks as well.
The principal set of international regulations directed to establishing capital levels at individual
banks is now known as Basel lll. It has received strong support from the G20 process, having
been emphasized in successive G20 communiques. Moreover, both the Basel committee on
Banking Supervision and the Financial Stability Board (upgraded from the Financial Stability
Forum) have had their memberships expanded to more closely resemble the G20. The intention
is to build greater global “credibility” for the recommendations made by these two bodies.
Basel lll lays out new and higher capital requirements than Basel ll,43 and also specifies what is
to be done when certain requirements are not met. As well, it also significantly tightens the
definition of capital, by excluding a number of liabilities that would not actually be loss-
absorbing in a crisis. The framework also specifies a series of dates for introduction of various
measures. Basel lll is intended to apply only to internationally active banks, as was the original
intention under Basel l. However, some jurisdictions (e.g., the European Union) are applying it
to all banks. This has raised numerous objections, not least to the complexity of calculating the
capital requirements and the associated costs of compliance for smaller firms. 
The Basel committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has also instituted a comprehensive
program for assessing whether member countries are complying with the new capital
regulations.44 Insofar as the timing of intended conformance is concerned, the latest report45
indicates that the 27 member countries of the BCBS are well advanced in the adoption of the
Basel lll capital regulations. Final rules are already being enforced in 11 countries and have
been published in three others. In all the remaining countries, draft rules have been published
and discussions with the banking industry are ongoing. While delays have been observed in
two crucial areas, the United States and the European Union, the relevant authorities have
made firm commitments to rapid implementation of Basel lll.46 That said, worrisome
differences in the specifics of the suggested rules in different regions have been identified.47
This raises the danger of important countries or regions backsliding on the grounds that some
other country or region is not playing “according to the rules.” 
43 See: Basel committee on Banking Supervision, “Calibrating Regulatory Minimum Capital Requirements and Capital
Buffers: A Top Down Approach,” October 2010. For an excellent overview of all aspects of Basel lll, see: P-E.
Chabanel, Basel lll Regulations Update, Moody's Analytics, June 2012.
44 This work takes place at three levels and, for the moment, focuses on compliance with respect to capital
requirements. Level 1 ensures the timely adoption of Basel lll. The last report in April 2013 covers all members of
the committee. Level 2 ensures regulatory consistency with Basel lll. To date, only four countries have been covered.
Level 3 ensures consistency of outcomes. To date, the committee has focused on the calculation of risk weights at the
level of individual banks. The results of two initial reports are discussed below. 
45 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Progress Report on Implementation of the Basel Regulatory
Framework,” April 2013. 
46 Given the complexity of the regulatory structure in the U.S., and the need to get all member countries on side in the
EU, some delay might have been anticipated. In Europe, one cause for delay was a vigorous debate as to whether all
countries would have to have the same capital requirements, or whether individual countries could opt for still higher
capital levels. The European Commission argued for the former, while the U.K. and Sweden (and some others) took
the latter position. In the end, a compromise was reached.
47 The Level 2 compliance studies completed to date have covered the U.S., the EU and Japan along with Singapore.
The U.S. is non-compliant in only one respect. Its regulations eschew all references to rating agencies, while Basel lll
still relies on them to some extent. The EU is materially non-compliant in two respects, the more important of which
is that its definition of capital is broader than Basel lll. As actual capital levels rise in European banks, the hope is
that the definition of capital will come in line. For an overview, see: N. Veron, “Challenges of Europe’s Fourfold
Union” (prepared statement before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations: Subcommittee on European
Affairs, Washington, August 16, 2012). K. Lanno (“Bonus Compromise Masks Basel Cheese,” Financial Regulation
International, April 23, 2013) notes worrisome aspects of the Capital Requirements Directive IV, which is the
directive to implement Base llll in Europe. He contends that it has been drafted so as to allow significant differences
in the application of Basel lll across European countries. 
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The Basel committee has also surveyed the world’s largest 101 banks and calculated the
amount of supplementary capital they would need if they were to meet the final capital targets
(seven per cent of Tier 1 equity by 2019) today. As of June 2012, this shortfall was 176 billion
euros versus a shortfall of 386 billion euros only six months earlier. This “progress” has led the
committee to conclude that the big banks were likely to meet their requirements some years
before they were formally required to do so, and that they could likely do so through retained
profits. This said, a number of large banks (particularly in Europe) still seem to face some
significant challenges. 
In spite of this apparent “progress,” two important analytical issues continue to be debated. The
first has to do with the timing of the introduction of the capital measures in particular. The
Basel committee gave long lead times, specifically to avoid raising capital in the middle of an
ongoing recession. Its fear was that higher capital requirements might lead to slower credit
growth, which would make the economic weakness more intractable. Needless to say, the
banking community echoed these concerns, going even further to suggest that the Basel
committee’s deadlines were still far too tight.48 In contrast, the Swiss National Bank and the
European Banking Authority independently mandated much higher and much earlier capital
requirements than did the Basel committee. Since the Basel standards lay out minimum
requirements, the committee could not object to tighter standards, yet many others continued to
question the effect of an earlier imposition of higher capital requirements on the supply of
credit. In Europe in particular, credit growth has been very restrained, particularly for small
and medium-sized enterprises. It is of course very difficult to distinguish the effects on credit
growth of these regulatory developments from the macro-economic effects of the eurozone
crisis more generally.49
The second analytical issue has to do with the level of the capital requirements imposed by
Basel lll. What is incontrovertible is that the basic level of capital required under Basel lll will
rise from two per cent under Basel ll to seven per cent of risk-weighted assets,50 and that the
definition of capital will be much stricter. What needs to be remembered, however, is that the
required levels of capital under Basel ll were designed to be close to those under Basel l, and
the original requirements were close to the levels of capital that banks already held. In short,
there was never at any point a rigorous analysis of how much capital banks should hold. Put
otherwise, we know capital requirements have risen under Basel lll, but we do not know if they
have risen enough.
48 The effects on the global economy of implementing the capital standards as anticipated were investigated by the
official community and by the Institute for International Finance, representing the banks. The former concluded that
the shorter-term costs of higher capital (and the avoidance of very costly downturns) were minimal, whereas the
latter concluded the shorter-term costs would be very heavy indeed. Since none of the models used to support these
different conclusions actually included a developed financial sector, there must be a suspicion (at the least) that ad
hoc assumptions produced the results desired.
49 While loans to small and medium-sized firms have fallen everywhere in the eurozone, the declines have been much
greater in the so called “peripheral” countries whose continued membership in the eurozone remains most in doubt.
50 The seven per cent comprises a minimum equity requirement plus a “conservation buffer.” In addition, Basel lll
allows for other supplementary capital requirements (especially “counter-cyclical” surcharges and surcharges for
SIFIs) that could raise the required ratio to as high as 13 per cent. 
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This uncertainty sparked a vigorous debate, which continued into 2013. On the one hand, some
have contended that the Basel lll requirements are already having a significant impact on how
banks behave.51 Reflecting higher risk-weights, banks are withdrawing from riskier activities.
As with the timing issue discussed above, representatives of the banking industry also contend
that the current higher capital requirements are already raising credit spreads and threatening
loan growth. Still-higher requirements would threaten economic recovery even more. Finally, it
has been suggested that higher regulatory requirements for capital quickly become treated as
absolute minimum requirements by the market. In effect, available capital can no longer be
used for the purpose for which it was originally intended: i.e., absorbing unexpected losses.52
This argument needs serious attention, since it suggests the possibility of a ratcheting-up of
target levels for capital that could have serious economic effects. 
On the other hand, a wide variety of commentators have suggested that banks’ capital ratios
should be much higher.53 They argue that this would not impede growth and would minimize
the likelihood of costly crises. A common empirical thread is the observation that banks held
much more capital in earlier decades and that there is no evidence that lending and economic
growth were materially lower. At the level of theory, Admati and Hellwig54 essentially rely on
the Modigliani-Miller theorem to suggest that higher capital ratios would not lower the risk-
adjusted rate of return on equity in banking. In effect, with a higher equity ratio, banking
would be less risky which would allow banks to raise financing much more cheaply.55 In
contrast, Jackson and Birchler56 suggest that there are many reasons why the Modigliani-
Miller theorem does not apply in the real world.57 Further, there is the question of where the
increased equity investment would come from and whether it might not raise capital costs
elsewhere, to the broader detriment of fixed capital investment.58 Since there does not seem to 
51 See for example: A. Barker and T. Braithwaite, “EU and Fed Clash over US Bank Move,” Financial Times, April 23,
2013; and Risk, “Basel lll Starts to Bite,” January 3, 2013. In particular, higher capital requirements have made short-
term repo financing more expensive, and this market has recently been contracting. It remains to be seen whether this
is a welcome or a worrisome development.
52 In principle, supervisors might envisage that a higher capital ratio could be ratcheted down, thus evoking ever-
stronger supervisory oversight and eventual resolution. This process would, however, be impeded if the markets
panicked whenever regulatory capital began to fall, even from high levels.
53 See, for example: Admati and Hellwig, The Banker’s New Clothes; A. Turner, “Leverage, Maturity Transformation
and Financial Stability: Challenges Beyond Basel lll,” Case Business School, 2011; T. Hoenig, “Get Basel lll Right
and There Will be no Need for Basel lV,” Financial Times, December 13, 2012; and D. Miles, J. Yang and G.
Marcheggiano, “Optimal Bank Capital,” Bank of England, External MPC Unit Discussion Paper 31, 2012.
54 Admati and Hellwig, The Banker’s New Clothes.
55 Some would contend that this is already happening. Barclays issued a bond in 2012 with a coupon of only 7.5 per
cent in spite of a provision that the bond would be written down to nothing if pre-specified minimum capital ratios
were breached. In addition, spreads on bank bonds continue to tighten. See: V. Rodriguez and S. Foley,  “Bonds
Bloom as Banks Rendered Less likely to Fail,” Financial Times, April 26, 2013.
56 P. Jackson and U. Birchler, “The Future of Bank Capital,” Central Banking Journal, September 24, 2012.
57 In particular, banks are subsidized by the state in two ways. First, interest payments are deductible from profits for
tax purposes. Second, deposit insurance and other safety-net provisions imply they can attract deposits at lower
interest rates than otherwise. It seems odd that the state should subsidize activities whose dangers the state would
subsequently decry. The evident way to square the circle would be to remove the subsidies and accept that lending
costs would rise somewhat. 
58 Financial Times, “Bank Leverage,” Lex Column, April 27, 2013.
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be much support from regulators for the basic suggestion of Admati and Hellwig, that an
unweighted capital ratio of 15 to 20 per cent should be imposed on all banks, the official sector
seems yet to be convinced.59
A complicating feature of this debate has to do with the definition of capital. While Basel lll
narrows the definition when compared to previous practices, it still allows enough flexibility of
interpretation to allow quite divergent practices between the United States and Europe. In
particular, under the Dodd-Frank bill, contingent capital bonds (CoCos) are not allowed,
whereas in Europe, they are. To date, two kinds of these bonds have been issued in Europe.
Some are bonds that convert into equity when a bank’s capital ratio falls below a certain
threshold set by regulators, and some are bonds that are written off entirely. Moreover, it is
clear that significant efforts are likely to be made in devising still other variants.60 The debate
continues on the pros and cons of these types of instruments, with Admati and Hellwig61
perhaps the most categorical. While contingent liabilities might be preferred by the banking
industry, they offer no broader advantage than do higher levels of more narrowly defined
capital.
Another feature of Basel lll is that, together with its continued reliance on risk-weighted capital
requirements, it also imposes an overall (unweighted) leverage ratio as a “backstop.” One
reason for this seems to have been concerns that banks have been “gaming” the risk weights
ever since they were introduced in 1988. Blundell-Wignall et al.62 and Slovik63 show how the
ratio of weighted to unweighted risk assets in fact has been declining steadily ever since Basel
I was introduced. Haldane64 also notes that risk weights have many other disadvantages, not
least an inherent unreliability.65 In effect, he suggests that the problem bankers face is not the
evaluation of risks, but Knightian uncertainty. The euro crisis, with its attendant pressures on
the ratings and credit spreads of a number of sovereigns, has also called into question whether
sovereigns should continue to be assigned zero risk weights,66 as at present. Worries about the
“procyclicality” of the risk weights chosen by banks have already been referred to above.
59 Chapters 12 and 13 of Admati and Hellwig (The Banker’s New Clothes) ask why this might be the case, and suggest
the influence of vigorous bank lobbying and the more general (and traditional) problem of regulatory capture. That
said, prominent members (or ex-members) of the official community, such as Mervyn King and Paul Volcker, have
stated publically that the Basel lll requirements are too low.
60 See: T. Hartford (“Markets Must Force Banks To Grow Up,” Financial Times, August 21, 2013) and his reference to
equity recourse notes.
61 Admati and Hellwig, The Banker’s New Clothes.
62 A. Blundell-Wignall, G. Wehinger and P. Slovik, “The Elephant in the Room: the Need to Deal with What Banks
Do,” OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 2 (2009).
63 P. Slovik, “Systemically Important Banks and Capital Regulation Changes,” OECD Economic Working Papers 916,
2011.
64 A. Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee” (presented at “The Changing Policy Landscape” symposium, sponsored by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 31, 2012).
65 The related issues of data, modeling and risk measurement are considered further below.
66 More broadly, a number of commentators have seen these zero weights as part of a broader trend towards “financial
repression,” which aims to lower the real borrowing costs of highly indebted sovereigns. See: C. Reinhart and M. B.
Sbrancia, “The Liquidation of Government Debt,” NBER Working Paper 16893, March 2011.
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These identified shortcomings of the risk-weighted approach have led to a spectrum of
proposals. As noted, the Basel committee treats the leverage ratio as a backstop to the risk-
weighted requirements and there is some evidence that the banking industry would go along.67
Haldane68 states explicitly that the two ratios should be treated as of equal importance, but the
thrust of his argument seems to sympathize more with Hoenig.69 Hoenig feels the leverage ratio
should have precedence and the risk-weighted ratio should be the backstop. Blundell-Wignall
and Atkinson70 go one step further and ask whether one needs the risk-weighted requirements
at all. They contend that the banks’ proven capacity to shift risk outside of the formal banking
system implies that the unweighted ratio will always be the binding constraint, and that the
weighted ratio can be dispensed with. Further, Blundell-Wignall and Roulet,71 and Haldane,72
also conclude that the unweighted leverage ratio is a much better predictor of default risk than
the weighted ratio. Given the very high costs of complying with Basel lll, for both banks and
supervisors,73 this issue is of great practical importance.
Along with Admati and Hellwig,74 Hoenig and others also recommend a leverage ratio that is
many multiples of the ratio (three per cent) suggested in Basel lll. However, recent statements
by U.S. banks that they need only “shuffle assets” to meet higher leverage requirements75 must
raise doubts about the effectiveness of these unweighted ratios as well. In response to such
concerns about “gaming” the ratios, Goodhart,76 and Admati and Hellwig,77 have suggested
regulators should demand increases in the absolute level of capital held by banks. This would
have the further advantage of reducing the incentive for banks to cut loans, as a way of
meeting capital requirements couched in terms of ratios.
Finally with respect to capital requirements, Basel lll continues to rely on rating agencies to set
risk weights under the “standardized approach.” One problem with this is that the Dodd-Frank
Act in the United States explicitly rules out the use of such ratings. Another issue has to do
with the poor quality of some ratings. Consider the problems associated with the AAA ratings
67 P. Sands, “When it Comes to Banks, Simplest is Not Always Best,” Financial Times, August 27, 2013.
68 Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee.”
69 T. Hoenig, “Basel lll Capital: A Well-Intentioned Illusion” (remarks to the International Association of Deposit
Insurers, Basel, Switzerland, April 9, 2013).
70 A. Blundell-Wignall and P. E. Atkinson, “Thinking Beyond Basel lll: Necessary Conclusions for Capital and
Liquidity,” OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends 1 (2010).
71 A. Blundell-Wignall and C. Roulet, “Business Models of Bank Leverage and the Distance to Default,” OECD
Journal: Financial Market Trends 2 (2013).
72 Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee.”
73 See the references in Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee,”  12.
74 Admati and Hellwig, The Banker’s New Clothes.
75 T. Braithwaite and T. Alloway “US Banks Plan to Shuffle Assets to Meet New Rules on Leverage,” Financial Times,
July 11, 2013.
76 C. A. E. Goodhart, “From National Towards European/Global Financial Regulation,” in SUERF: 50 years of Money
and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, ed. Morten Balling and Ernest Gnan (Vienna:  Larcier, November 2013).
77 Admati and Hellwig, The Banker’s New Clothes.
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of structured products, revealed as erroneous by the onset of the global crisis, and the sudden
revision of sovereign ratings in the context of the euro crisis. However, whether these specific
shortcomings78 should call into question the validity of all ratings provided by rating agencies
remains very much an open question. Moreover, to the extent banks (and others) rely less on
the “opinions” of rating agencies, they must find some alternative. One possibility is that the
Bank for International Settlements (or some other institution equally capable of respecting
confidentiality) might collect “internal ratings” for all borrowing entities from a wide range of
lenders known to carry out such assessments. If the full distribution of such results were to be
published, the uncertainties associated with ratings would then become much clearer. 
Not surprisingly, given market developments during the crisis, Basel lll also lays out new
standards concerning liquidity management. These regulations prescribe the need for short-
term liquidity requirements (the capacity to sell enough assets to meet a cumulative liquidity
shortfall over a 30-day period) and also the need for a stable funding ratio over time. The
implication of the latter is that banks should rely much more on stable retail deposits rather
than wholesale sources of funding that could dry up at any moment. Both suggestions proved
very controversial. The timing of the introduction of the stable-funding requirement has been
put off repeatedly, no doubt reflecting the difficulties it would pose for banks (especially
European banks) that had become increasingly reliant on wholesale funding in recent years.79
In March 2013, the BCBS also agreed to weaken the short-term liquidity requirement (by both
lowering the threshold for expected outflows and widening the spectrum of assets judged to be
eligible to meet liquidity requirements). While some critics saw this as a capitulation to bank
lobbying, Wagner80 and others suggested there were valid concerns that implementation of the
original proposals would actually prove counterproductive.
Recent discussions about a “banking union” in the eurozone serve to remind us that the
regulation and supervision of banks is only one of three features required for a properly
functioning banking system. The other two features are a well-designed deposit-insurance
scheme and an efficient legal mechanism for resolving banks that are deemed to be insolvent.
The latter is a mechanism for offsetting the “moral hazard” generated by the former. Similarly,
absent the ultimate threat of insolvency, the regulation of financial institutions is bound to be
highly inefficient and market discipline will also not work properly. While a discussion of
deposit insurance issues is beyond the scope of this paper, it would seem worth reviewing
recent developments with respect to bank-resolution procedures.
78 For example, it is now clear that it was effectively impossible to provide a rating for many structured products that
would demonstrate any stability over time. See: I. Fender, N. Tarashev and H. Zhu, “Credit Fundamentals, Ratings
and Value-at-Risk: CDOs vs Corporate Exposures,” BIS Quarterly Review (March 2008); and J. D. Coval, J. Jurek
and E. Stafford, “The Economics of Structured Finance,” Harvard Business School Working Paper 09-060, 2008. The
latter show that even modest imprecision in the parameters used in rating methodologies could lead to wide variation
in the default risk of structured products such as CDOs. Further, these products “substitute risks that are highly
diversifiable for risks that are highly systematic” (page 2). As for sovereign ratings, it could be that the rating
methodology could be significantly improved. For a new initiative in this area, see: Bertelsmann Foundation,
“Blueprint for INCRA: an International Non-Profit Credit Rating Agency,” 2013.
79 The development of the “shadow banking” system, characterized by increased reliance on securitization and
wholesale funding, will be discussed further below. 
80 W. Wagner, “Liquidity Regulation Can Reduce Liquidity,” The Banker, February 4, 2013.
17
Bank-resolution procedures demand different legislation from normal corporate bankruptcies.
The externalities from bank failures are very different, and resolution must often be carried out
quickly to avoid uncertainty and contagion effects. The crisis has made it clear that bank-
resolution procedures were, and often remain, inadequate in many jurisdictions. Absent the
legal capacity to resolve a banking crisis in an orderly way, the only alternative seen was to
keep the institution functioning so as to avoid a disorderly outcome. In many jurisdictions,
there was also a significant degree of concern that forcing losses onto the creditors of
threatened banks could also have contagion effects, not least that it would significantly raise
the borrowing costs of other banks. In this fashion, even small banks might prove “systemic.” 
Consistent with such fears, and as noted above, “bail out” has generally been preferred to “bail
in.” Particularly remarkable has been the extraordinarily lenient treatment given to senior
creditors in the current crisis in Europe. Only in late-2012 and 2013 did the failure and
nationalization of SNS REALL bank in the Netherlands, and the treatment of the banking crisis
in Cyprus, give hints of an approach that would be tougher on private creditors.81 This new
approach was confirmed in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive issued on June 27,
2013. Dubel82 traces the evolution of this process, beginning with the banking crisis in Greece
and culminating with the crisis in Cyprus. In particular, he documents how potentially “bail-
enable” capital was allowed to leave at the European taxpayer expense.83 This crucial issue of
bank-resolution procedures is returned to below, in the context of systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs).
Measures taken to support banks in the U.K., the U.S. and many European countries have all
involved the commitment of significant amounts of government money. In a number of
jurisdictions, particularly in Europe, fears remain of still-greater expenditures. In virtually
every country, government debt levels are already so high that significant bank-related
expenditures might call into question the capacity of governments to service such debts. This
has already happened in a number of peripheral countries in Europe: the so-called, bank-
sovereign instability nexus. Similar problems cannot be ruled out elsewhere.
81 Yet there remained considerable uncertainty about what these “hints” might lead to. Resolution of SNS REALL was
originally said to be a template for future bank resolutions in Europe, but this was almost immediately denied. To add
to the uncertainty, the initial proposal to deal with a troubled bank in Cyprus reversed the “normal” order in which
creditors were to take losses. Senior bondholders were left untouched (although they represented a very small share
of total liabilities) while insured depositors were initially supposed to take a significant haircut. 
82 H-J. Dubel, “Creditor Participation in the Banking Crisis in the Eurozone – A Corner Turned?” study commissioned
by The Greens/European Free Alliance in the European Parliament, June 28, 2013.
83 Beyond these explicit fiscal costs, it is somewhat ironic that the “bail out ” approach did not succeed in avoiding
contagion from Greece to other peripheral eurozone countries. Moreover, as a tougher approach to bank creditors did
emerge, it did not trigger still more contagion. For example, after the suggestion that insured depositors in Cyprus
should take a haircut, there was no increase in deposit flight from peripheral countries. Of course, this could still
happen in the future.
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MACRO-PRUDENTIAL INITIATIVES
Three sets of issues will be discussed below: the treatment of systemically important financial
institutions, the issue of inter-linkages via the inter-bank and derivatives market, and finally,
the use of counter-cyclical policies to reduce the amplitude of “boom-bust” cycles driven by
imprudent lending and “procyclicality” in the financial system. The first two reflect the cross-
sectional aspect of the macro-prudential approach, whereas the third reflects a response to the
changing time dimension. All three focus on issues affecting the system as a whole, not just its
constituent parts.
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)
The so-called SIFIs have received attention from the Basel committee and also from the
Financial Stability Board (FSB). At the moment, 29 banks have been classified as SIFIs,
reflecting the belief (based on objective evidence) that they are so large, so interconnected, or
are so dominant in important spheres of finance that they cannot be allowed to fail in a
disorderly way.84 The systemic implications would be too great. The fact that there is also great
uncertainty about what these effects might be, especially given the high degree of
interdependence among large firms, has been a further argument for official support, should
fears arise of such a failure.85
There is a developing literature on how to estimate the contribution made to systemic risk by
individual financial institutions.86 In principle, this might be used to calibrate the relative need
for the use of supplementary instruments to influence the behaviour of all financial institutions.
Then, there would be no need to designate institutions as SIFIs, with all the associated moral
hazard. As noted above, the implicit subsidy given to SIFIs has widened significantly since the
crisis began. Moreover, there is an unwelcome dynamic here in that healthy SIFIs have the
capacity to devour their competitors, becoming even more SIFI-like in the process. In practice,
however, it has been decided that there must be a hard distinction made between institutions
designated as SIFIs and all others. This decision deserves to be revisited. 
84 Blundell-Wignall and Roulet (“Business Models of Bank Leverage”) provide econometric evidence, drawn from a
panel of 34 large banks, that default risk is strongly influenced by a bank’s chosen business model. In particular,
there is “strong evidence that the gross market value of derivatives is a key driver of the distance to default” (page
14). They further postulate that this exposure also seems correlated with leverage, size and reliance on wholesale
funding, all of which seem to contribute to the probability of default. 
85 Paul Volcker feels this has been the single most important reason for forbearance in the post-crisis period. See: Paul
Volcker, “Protecting the Stability of Global Financial Markets,” in “Macro-Prudential Regulatory Policies”
Proceedings of a Conference Sponsored by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the International Monetary
Fund, World Scientific Publishing Co. Ltd., 3–10. Astonishingly, because of concerns about systemic problems
arising from reputational loss, a number of bankers who committed criminal acts have not been prosecuted by the
U.S. Department of Justice. See: M. Taibbi, “Gangster Bankers: Too Big to Jail,” Rolling Stone, February 14, 2013. 
86 See: M. Dhremann and N. Tarashev, “Systemic Importance: Some Simple Indicators,” BIS Quarterly Review (March
2011).
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A number of steps have been taken, or have been suggested, to reduce the expected losses
associated with the disorderly failure of a SIFI. Cecchetti,87 Haldane88 and many others are of
the view that these measures are grossly inadequate. Indeed, as Cecchetti suggests89 the
measures taken can only be judged adequate when “the FSB’s list of G-SIFIs (global SIFIs) …
is blank.” Or, as the governor of the Bank of England said earlier, “Any institution that is too
big to fail is too big to exist.” Against this standard, the actions of the BCBS seem very
limited. In December, the Basel committee (2011) circulated a document that suggested90 SIFIs
should have higher risk-weighted capital ratios than those imposed on ordinary banks under
Basel lll. This makes sense in that it reduces the probability of a disorderly default.
Nevertheless, the size of the surcharge seems far too small to offset the expected costs should a
SIFI fail in a disorderly way.91 This raises again the issue of whether risk-weighted capital
ratios are generally too low. As for leverage ratios, the three-per-cent capital requirement under
Basel lll was thought too low by the Vickers commission in the U.K. Instead the committee
suggested a four-per-cent ratio. Regulators in the U.S. announced in mid-2013 that they would
impose a five-per-cent leverage standard.92
This measure also seems somewhat anomalous in that it does not attack directly the factors that
lead to such institutions having the potential (size, interconnectedness and concentration) to
wreak such systemic damage in the first place.93 In fact, a number of proposals for structural
change have been made to reduce the systemic fallout from the failure of a SIFI. Among the
better-known proposals, one would have to include the Volcker rule in the United States, the
Liinkanen proposals in Europe, and the Vickers proposals in the United Kingdom. These
proposals are all similar in that each suggests that problems seem most likely to arise in the
investment banking arm of a SIFI and that some aspects of these activities should be “ring-
fenced.” This may reflect the recent evidence that investment banks were, in fact, virtually
unique in running up their leverage ratios prior to the crisis.94 However, in other important
ways, the proposals made in different jurisdictions do differ, as described in Gambacorta and
van Rixtel.95 This diversity bears witness to the fact that there is no agreed answer on the best
structural solution to the problem. 
87 S. Cecchetti, “The Future of Financial Intermediation.”
88 Haldane, “Have We Solved.”
89 S. Cecchetti, “The Future of Financial Intermediation,” 5.
90 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Global Systemically Important Banks: Assessment Methodologies and
Higher Loss Absorbency Requirements,” November 2011.
91 See: A. Haldane, “On Being the Right Size” (speech given at the Institute of Economic Affairs, The Beesley
Lectures, September 14, 2012).
92 It might also be suggested that the leverage ratio might be raised by a “conservation” buffer or moved counter-
cyclically, as is already proposed for the risk-weighted capital requirements.
93 Admati and Hellwig (The Banker’s New Clothes) focus on capital requirements (reducing the probability of failure)
because they are highly skeptical that measures to reduce the costs associated with a SIFI failure will have any
meaningful effect.
94 S. Kalemli-Ozcan, B. Sorenson and S. Yesiltas, “Leverage Across Firms, Banks and Countries,” Mimeo, August
2011; and Blundell-Wignall, Wehinger and Slovik, “The Elephant in the Room.”
95 L. Gambacorta and A. van Rixtel, “Structural Bank Regulation Initiatives: Approaches and Implications,” Bank for
International Settlements Working Paper 412, April 2013.
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Perhaps reflecting such uncertainties, the political will to rigorously pursue these initiatives
seems lacking. The French and German governments have recently passed legislation that is
significantly less ambitious than the Liikanen proposals. On the one hand, this could well be a
capitulation to bank lobbying.96 On the other hand, concern has also arisen that the partial ring-
fencing suggested by extant proposals might have costs as well as benefits. Gambacorta and
van Rixtel97 suggest that current ring-fencing proposals might provide disincentives for
globalization, are likely to make resolution procedures even more difficult, and could
encourage migration out of the regulated sector altogether. Critics of separation proposals also
note that many of the banks that got into trouble did so through making bad loans (mostly
retail), rather than through unprofitable trading.98
Yet there are signs of motion in the opposite direction as well. In July 2013, a bill was
introduced into the U.S. Senate that proposed bringing back many provisions of the Glass-
Steagall Act — a much stricter form of ring-fencing. The OECD also continues to recommend,
based on the work of Blundell-Wignall and his colleagues, a strict separation of traditional
banking functions from investment-banking functions through the use of a non-operating
holding-company structure. Haldane99 also seems sympathetic to a cleaner separation. Indeed,
Barr and Vickers100 contend that there is actually a growing agreement across countries that a
U.S.-style bank-holding-company structure (“structured universal banking”) has a great deal to
recommend it. Whether such initiatives will garner broader political support remains to be
seen, but there is certainly broad popular support for punishing both banks and bankers.
Having the legal capacity to resolve a SIFI in an orderly way is obviously even more important
than having the capacity to do so for a normal bank. Unfortunately, resolving a SIFI is much
more complicated than in the case of a normal bank. First, most SIFIs have an enormously
complicated internal structure. Some have literally thousands of legal subsidiaries. Second,
virtually all SIFIs operate internationally and are subject to diverse, national legislation. As
well, they are subject to oversight by both home and host supervisors, which raises the issue of
international co-operation with respect to both crisis management and crisis resolution. In the
aftermath of the crisis, the FSB sought to deal with all these issues by developing the “Key
Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.”101 Subsequently, they
also conducted a series of peer reviews to establish where there were gaps between current
practice and the key attributes. As well, cross-border crisis-management groups were set up to
develop high-level resolution procedures for each G-SIFI.
96 F. Guerrera (“Banks need simpler remedies,” The Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2011) suggests “They (the big
banks) think that if they can survive a few tough years, they will benefit from a system, blessed by regulators, that
concentrates power in a few large institutions.” In light of the discussion in Section A.1 above, this seems all too
plausible.
97 Gambacorta and van Rixtel, “Structural Bank Regulation.”
98 While this is true, the retail business of many banks may have been conducted in a more imprudent way because
investment bankers were in charge of the unified entity.
99 Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee,” 23.
100 M. Barr and J. Vickers, “Banks need Far More Structural Reform to be Safe,” Financial Times, July 21, 2013. 
101 Financial Stability Board, “Key Attributes for Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions,” November 4,
2011.
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What has emerged is that fundamental shortcomings still exist, and progress in dealing with
them is likely to be very slow.102 The heart of the issue (as with non-systemic institutions)
continues to be wholly inadequate domestic legislation. Resolution authorities lack the powers
to wind down a SIFI, and often even the powers (e.g., temporary stays on the termination of
financial contracts) to manage crises better. Indeed, in a number of jurisdictions, the authorities
do not even have the power to force a SIFI to reorganize itself to facilitate subsequent
resolution.103 As for the international dimension, the FSB documents suggest that the state of
play is even worse. In many, perhaps even most, jurisdictions, there are no domestic
procedures in place to allow co-operation with foreign authorities trying to resolve a SIFI. In
fact, in many cases, there are laws that still forbid the sharing of confidential information
crucial to the resolution process.  
In addition to these legal shortcomings, progress on cross-border resolution issues might be
held back by other complications. First, as always, individual countries are hesitant to cede the
degree of sovereignty that a more ideal solution demands. This is a broader problem leading to
regulatory fragmentation across countries. Second, and closely related, individual countries
might lose faith in a co-operative solution and turn to unilateral action. For example, in
February 2012, Governor Tarullo of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors announced plans
to apply the same capital and liquidity rules on foreign-bank holding companies operating in
the U.S. as those applying to U.S. holding companies.104 The U.K. and Swiss authorities are
also trying to get more control over international banks operating in their jurisdictions. The
fundamental objective of these measures is to ensure that domestic depositors have access to
assets to meet their claims in the case of bankruptcy. Third, differences in international practice
can also impede co-operative solutions. For example, Dodd-Frank in the U.S. emphasizes the
speedy shut down of failing SIFIs. In contrast, continental Europeans seem to prefer keeping
such institutions alive through the prior issue of CoCos and the like, as described above. 
Faced with all these complications, it seems inevitable that the issue of branches versus
subsidiaries will come to the fore once again. While banks prefer branches, because it allows a
more efficient pooling of both capital and liquidity, domestic regulators fear that domestic
creditors of cross-border banks will suffer in a crisis. Separately capitalized subsidiaries
provide a solution to this problem.
102 Financial Stability Board, “The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps,” September 2012; and Financial Stability
Board, “Consultation Paper on a Common Template for Global Systemically Important Banks,” October 6, 2012. 
103 This is related to what is popularly known as the “living will” issue. In principle, each SIFI should itself describe, ex
ante, how it might be wound down (which units might be sold at a profit, which units might be preserved to carry out
essential functions, etc.). If the regulator were not satisfied with the feasibility of this plan, it could order a
restructuring of the organization. However, the regulator would have to have the legal powers to do so, and in many
jurisdictions this is lacking. 
104 Deutsche Bank and Barclays discarded their position as U.S.-bank-holding companies in anticipation of this plan.
The European reaction to this proposal has been distinctly hostile. See Barker and Braithwaite (“EU and Fed Clash
over US Bank Move”), who quote Michel Barnier (EU commissioner for financial services) as saying this was a
“protectionist reaction” that could lead to “retaliation” against U.S. banks. The mood was not lightened by comments
from the Federal Reserve that U.S. banks should not count on regulators co-operating internationally in the event of a
crisis.
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Risks Arising from Inter-linkages between Institutions 
In March 2013, the Basel committee issued a consultative document that proposed a sharp
reduction in the allowed degree of inter-bank exposure for SIFIs.105 This comes on top of a
number of the measures noted above, which also have implications for this issue. For example,
the Volcker plan to reduce proprietary trading by investment banks not only reduces the
potential losses from such exposures, but also aims to reduce such trading among banks and
thus the inter-linkages among them. As noted above, Volcker is of the view that uncertainty
about the character of these linkages was the primary reason for the support provided by the
U.S. government to the derivatives unit of AIG in 2008. 
Of course, to the extent that the problem is one of uncertainty about inter-linkages, this could
be rectified by more transparent and real-time reporting. There is a growing literature on this,106
prompted in part by the possibilities opened up by new technology. More ominously, many
hold the view that banks have under-invested in new technology for many years, and that this
could have systemic implications — not least through failures in the payments and settlements
system.107 Addressing the inter-linkages issue is then seen as a wedge to address these broader
exposures. Efforts underway in the G20 to collect and interpret financial data, with a view to
preventing systemic problems, are discussed below. 
Two areas that have received particular attention in light of the crisis have been links through
the inter-bank markets and the derivatives markets. Worries about the former were first flagged
in the Holland Report to the Euro Currency Standing Committee (ECSC) at the BIS  in the
early 1980s. Moreover, the same committee then repeatedly revisited the issue.108 The basic
concern was a sudden drying-up of liquidity in the inter-bank market leading to a series of
cascading bankruptcies. In the end, however, nothing much was done. Against this background
of persistent concern, it is puzzling that the drying-up of the inter-bank market, after the failure
of Lehman Brothers in 2008, was seen by most central banks as totally surprising and
unexpected. This myopia likely had deeper roots in the belief, supported by the facts of “The
Great Moderation,” that improvements in the conduct of monetary policy had effectively
eliminated economic and financial cycles.109
The fundamental problem with reining in the inter-bank market is that inter-bank lending is a
key component of an efficient financial system. It transfers money from those with excess
deposits to those who have an excess demand for loans. This raises the difficult issue of
identifying the point at which this efficiency has become “too much of a good thing.” This
issue is pursued further in the context of the discussion of the “shadow banking” system.
There, wholesale flows of funds between banks, and also between banks and non-banks, play
an important role in the intermediation of funds between ultimate savers and investors. 
105 SIFIs would be allowed to conduct business with other big banks only up to an individual exposure limit of 10 to 15
per cent of core capital. This is well below the 25-per-cent limit previously recommended. 
106 See: R. Johnson, “Credible Resolution: What it Takes to End Too Big to Fail,” in “Make Markets Be Markets,”
Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute, 2010. He recommends trading limits between SIFIs and substantial
investment in information systems by big banks. 
107 A. Freeman (“Outdated Technology Could Lead to Another Crisis in Banking,” Financial Times, July 16, 2013) also
notes that IT issues are a substantial constraint on needed bank restructuring. 
108 The ECSC was renamed as the Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) in the late 1990s. At various
times, the committee received reports on this topic from the Frankel Working Group, the Yoshikuni Working Group
and the Brockmeijer Working Group.
109 See: White, “Is Monetary Policy a Science?”
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Cross-border inter-bank exposures, particularly in foreign currencies, have also been receiving
increasing attention as of late. On the one hand, the focus has been the traditional one of
financial instability. In the eurozone in particular, cross-border lending (in part through inter-
bank lending) rose sharply prior to the crisis.110 Lending banks in northern Europe thus became
heavily exposed to banks and other borrowers in the peripheral European countries. On the
other hand, there has also been growing attention paid to the impact of cross-border capital
flows on the functioning of the economies (real as well as financial) in the recipient countries.
In effect, banks are part of the international transmission mechanism through which credit
bubbles spread across countries.111 Both sets of concerns can have regulatory implications.
As for measures to safeguard the health of the financial system, national regulators of creditor
countries in eurozone countries have recently been encouraging their banks to reduce their
cross-border positions.112 While “prudent” from a micro-prudential perspective, it could
actually prove “imprudent” if the health of the eurozone were to deteriorate in consequence
and financial losses were to mount in turn.113 As for the effects of cross-border capital flows on
recipient countries, the IMF has recently suggested114 that countries that are the source of
capital outflows must take responsibility for the implications of those outflows for other
countries. This could in principle have implications for regulatory regimes in source countries,
and also for the conduct of monetary policy in AMEs and especially the United States.
Whether, in response, source countries will eschew “self-interest” in favour of “the broader
good” seems rather unlikely. What seems more likely is that this suggestion will provide
“cover” for recipient countries to rely more on macro-prudential measures (as discussed below)
and even overt capital controls.
Exposures arising from bilateral trading of derivatives have also been a priority for those
concerned about risks arising from inter-relationships between financial institutions. Uncertainty
about counter-party exposures, particularly to derivatives, was an important contributing factor to
the collapse of the inter-bank market in 2008. The principal suggestion to deal with it, strongly
supported by the G20 process, has been to change over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives into
exchange-traded derivatives. This means the exposure is no longer to another bank but to a
clearinghouse. This proposal was intended not only to reduce the dominance of banks and
associated systemic risks, but also to decrease counter-party risk through a greater reliance on
collateralization by the clearinghouses. Finally, implementation was also expected to provide more
transparency about exposures, given enhanced reporting requirements. 
110 This constituted the capital-flow financing of rising current-account imbalances within the eurozone. 
111 There is growing evidence that heavy cross-border capital flows provided by banks are a good indicator of
subsequent domestic crises. See: I. Fender and P. McGuire, “Bank Structure, Funding Risk and the Transmission of
Shocks across Countries: Concepts and Measurement,” BIS Quarterly Review (September 2010); C. Borio, R.
McCauley and P. McGuire, “Global Credit and Domestic Credit Booms,” BIS Quarterly Review (September 2011);
E. Takats, “Was it Credit Supply? Cross Border Bank Lending to Emerging Market Economies During the Financial
Crisis,” BIS Quarterly Review (June 2010); and V. Bruno and H.S. Shin, “Capital Flows and the Risk Taking Channel
of Monetary Policy,” Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 400, December 2012. 
112 The BIS reported that cross-border inter-bank lending, as a share of total cross-border lending, fell to a record low of
38 per cent in the fourth quarter of 2012. The share had been 46 per cent at the end of 2007. The retreat was most
evident in Europe and the United States. 
113 Private-sector capital outflows (absent compensating official flows) must induce a contraction of current-account
deficits. This could lead to deep recession and rising debt unsustainability. Greece, Ireland and Portugal are cases in
point. Further, were a debtor country to leave the eurozone, and then depreciate its new currency, the burden of debts
still denominated in euros would likely prove unsustainable. Widespread defaults would then threaten the health of
the creditors, including banks in northern Europe.
114 International Monetary Fund, “The Liberalisation and Management.”
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Unfortunately, a whole host of practical issues has arisen as participants have begun the
process of implementation. First, and perhaps most important, is the potential of this scheme to
aggravate fears of a growing shortage of collateral in the financial system. Not only will the
demand for collateral rise markedly,115 but the supply of effective collateral will fall as
collateral is increasingly “locked up” and unavailable for rehypothecation.116 Another emerging
problem has been the proliferation of such clearinghouses in recent years, often operating
under different national rules and legislation. In addition to concerns about declining standards,
dealing costs could rise substantially as the benefits provided by “netting” within individual
clearinghouses will be much reduced.117 As well, there is growing concern that clearinghouses
themselves might become sources of systemic instability. They will soon be massive counter-
parties to all the G-SIFIs, yet currently have relatively low levels of capitalization. Further,
given their international clientele, any instability will likely prove exceedingly hard to manage.
As for the limitations to increased transparency, and some cross-border accountancy issues
concerning derivates, they are discussed further below. 
A final issue that needs discussion is whether an increased reliance on exchanges really does
lower the expected losses from systemic failures within the financial system. A report issued in
2013 by the BIS,118 based on evidence presented by the Macroeconomic Assessment Group on
Derivatives, concludes that the benefits clearly outweigh the costs because the probability of
crises will be significantly reduced. Critics argue, however, that the new procedures do not
reduce the risk of losses overall, should a bank counter-party fail, but simply redistributes
them. Those without collateral will pay a larger proportion of the losses and, absent knowledge
of how precisely this might play out, the risks of a systemic crisis could either rise or fall. This
important issue also needs further consideration.
115 See: The Banker, “Collateral: the Hunt is On,” March 5, 2013; W. Allen and R. Moessner, “The Big Collateral
Squeeze,” Central Banking (March 19, 2013); and Futures and Options World, “The Collateral Cliff Approaches,”
January 1, 2013. Fears about collateral shortages had already been raised as a result of an increase in the issue of
covered bonds and the Basel lll requirement that banks routinely hold a much higher level of high-quality liquid
assets. Further, it is not just that collateral requirements will generally be higher at clearinghouses than has been
traditional for OTC transactions. The new regulations also require much higher collateral requirements for remaining
OTC derivatives transactions. This might be thought of as an incentive to use the exchanges instead, but the
requirement applies even to derivatives whose structure is such that they could not possibly be centrally cleared.
Finally, as central banks expand their balance sheets (in the context of “unconventional monetary policy”) they again
take collateral out of the system. This is just one of the many unintended consequences of such policies. See: W. R.
White, “Ultra Easy Monetary Policy and the Law of Unintended Consequences,” Globalisation and Monetary Policy
Institute, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper 126, 2012. A recent study by the CGFS (Committee on the
Global Financial System, “Asset Encumbrance, Financial Reform and the Demand for Collateral Assets,” CGFS
Papers 49 (2013)) downplays all these concerns. It notes that the problem is not an absolute shortage of collateral,
but whether it will be available to those who need it on a timely basis. It is not clear that this provides much solace.
116 On the repeated use of the same collateral (“rehypothecation”) see: M. Singh and J. Aitken, “The Sizeable Role of
Rehypothecation in the Shadow Banking System,” IMF Working Paper 10 (172), July 2010. Just as a decrease in the
velocity of circulation of money can constrain expansion of the money supply, a decline in the velocity of circulation
of collateral can constrain the functioning of the financial system. This could potentially produce serious strains. 
117 Another unintended consequence might be for swaps to be replaced by cheaper and less regulated futures contracts,
even though the hedge they provide might be less-perfect. Apparently such a transformation has already begun. See:
The Banker, “Collateral: the Hunt.”
118 Bank for International Settlements, “Macroeconomic Impact Assessment of OTC Derivatives Regulatory Reform,”
August 27, 2013.
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Counter-cyclical policies.
By way of background, it should be noted that macro-prudential measures to lean against either
the economic cycle or the (longer) financial cycle119 have only rarely been used in recent years in
the AMEs. Regulatory instruments such as minimum down payments for consumer credit, loan-
to-value ratios for mortgages, and variable reserve requirements were widely in use in AMEs in
the 1950s and 1960s. However, they were gradually phased out as the process of market
liberalization proceeded. Note the important implication that regulatory actions in AMEs have
been positively procyclical. That is, there has generally been no leaning against the upswing, but
as losses materialized in the downswing, regulatory requirements were generally tightened.
The first issue to be dealt with is whether leaning against the upswing of the financial cycle
with macro-prudential instruments would be effective. Some evidence on this can be drawn
from much earlier experiences in AMEs, but more recent evidence is drawn from EMEs. Most
of these countries have maintained the use of such instruments and have used them actively for
macro-prudential purposes in recent years. The evidence on their effectiveness in resisting
credit upswings is, however, rather mixed.120 Consider, for example, that the use of “dynamic
provisioning” in Spain still allowed the development of a massive credit bubble. That said,
because of the build up of loan-loss provisions, the Spanish banking system was better
prepared to ride out the downturn. As for the use of macro-prudential instruments in credit
downturns (the “bust” after the “boom”), Borio et al.121 note that upswings tend to be “long and
slow” while downturns are “abrupt and violent.” They conclude that the use of macro-
prudential instruments should reflect this asymmetry. In contrast, Goodhart has raised the
concern that such a policy might reduce confidence in the banking system and actually lead to
less lending in the downturn and not more, as intended.122 
The second issue is determining when the process of leaning might begin. This is very similar
to the “indicator” problem in conducting monetary policy. A decision is needed as to what
indicators to monitor, and what thresholds should trigger action. The Basel committee has
already suggested that national supervisors should consider raising required capital ratios when
the ratio of credit/GDP rises significantly above its long-term trend. Again, there is a
developing literature on these issues123 largely based on empirical evidence (probit analysis)
linking the probability of a banking (or some other kind of) crisis to sharp movements in credit
growth rates and/or increases in asset prices. These models, in contrast to those used in the
“risk map” analysis discussed below, are surprisingly parsimonious. 
119 See: Borio, “The Financial Cycle.”
120 See: G. Galati and R. Moessner, “Macro Prudential Policy — A Literature Review,” Bank for International
Settlements Working Paper, 2011; R. Moreno, “Policymaking from a Macro Prudential Perspective in Emerging
Market Economies,” Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 336, 2011; Committee on the Global
Financial System, “Macro Prudential Instruments and Frameworks: a Stocktaking of Issues and Experiences,” CGFS
Papers 38 (2010); International Monetary Fund, “Towards Effective Macroprudential Monetary Frameworks: an
Assessment of Stylized Institutional Models,” August 20, 2011, for overviews of the evidence.
121 Borio, “The Financial Cycle.”
122 See: W. White, “Summary of the Meeting,” First IMF Financial Stability and Systemic Risk Forum on “Borders of
Macroeconomic Policy,” Washington, D.C., March 8, 2013. The only way to ensure Goodhart’s prediction would not
materialize would be to ensure that banks had built up sufficiently high capital ratios prior to the downturn. Evidently
this was not done prior to the current downturn.
123 See: C. Borio and M. Dhremann, “Towards an Operational Framework for Financial Stability: ‘Fuzzy’ Measurement
and its Consequences,” Bank for International Settlements Working Paper, 2009; and R. Barrell et al., “Calibrating
Macro prudential Policy,” Mimeo, NIESR and Brunel University, September 10, 2010.
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A third issue is the choice of macro-prudential measures and their order/combination of use.
Evidently, conclusions here might be very country specific, depending on institutional structure,
perceived tradeoffs and preferences. Nevertheless, some guidelines in this regard have already
been prepared by the Committee on the Global Finance System (CGFS).124 A point amply made
in this CGFS paper, and a central theme of a recent IMF conference on the topic,125 is that there
are many uncertainties about the effectiveness, timing and efficiency of macro-prudential
measures. Given their experimental nature, policies should be introduced carefully.
Finally, there is the issue of whether the use of macro-prudential instruments to lean against the
credit cycle should be complemented by the use of monetary policy. I have argued in a recent
paper126 that monetary policy should play an active role in the tightening phase, not least
because the empirical evidence on the efficacy of macro-prudential instruments to moderate the
financial cycle is very mixed. This debate is very much ongoing, with different central banks
actually having very different views on this issue. The Bank of Japan (along with some other
Asian and the Nordic central banks) seem the most supportive, the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors the least supportive, and the European Central Bank (ECB) somewhere in between.
It should be noted that small open economies often have a bias towards the use of macro-
prudential policies in the credit upswing because it helps avoid the exchange-rate
appreciation127 likely to be triggered by higher interest rates. As for monetary policy in the
aftermath of a credit boom, there is one thing that the crisis has made clear: The Greenspan
view that monetary policy can always “clean up” easily after a crisis is just plain wrong.128
Prudential regulation, the “shadow-banking system” and innovation 
In the wake of the crisis, the “shadow-banking system” has received a great deal of attention.
One reason for this increased attention goes back to the perception that non-banks played a big
role in precipitating the crisis. One aspect of this was the role played by bank-supported (but
off-balance-sheet) special investment vehicles during the early part of the crisis. More broadly,
the withdrawal of funding from such entities by money-market mutual funds led directly to the
failure of Lehman Brothers. This, in turn, led to a subsequent drying up of the inter-bank loan
market. It is highly questionable, however, whether these dramatic events were the cause,
rather than just the trigger, for the economic and financial crisis that still continued six years
later.
124 Committee on the Global Financial System, “Operationalizing the Selection and Application of Macro Prudential
Instruments,” CGFS Papers 48 (2012).
125 For a summary of the proceedings, see: White, “Summary of the Meeting.”
126 W. R. White, “Should Monetary Policy Lean or Clean?” Globalisation and Monetary Policy Institute, Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper 34, 2009.
127 The so-called “fear of floating” has been an important phenomenon in recent decades. One legitimate reason (and
there are numerous illegitimate reasons) is that the theory of uncovered interest parity (UIP) only applies over very
long periods. Thus, exchange rates can overshoot fundamental value by significant amounts and for an extended
period.
128 See: M. Bech, L. Gambacorta and E. Kharroubi, “Monetary Policy in a Downturn: Are Financial Crises Special?”
Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 388, September 2012.
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Both the meaning and the measurement of “shadow banking” remain “shadowy.” The Financial
Stability Board defines the “shadow-banking system” as being all those financial activities that
involve the granting of credits that are essentially unregulated. As noted above, this paper
focuses more narrowly on those entities involved in the process of securitization of assets and
their funding through collateralized wholesale markets.129 This covers a wide spectrum of
financial institutions, including those specializing in collateral management, but allows a
separate consideration (below) of the regulations involving the insurance industry and pension
funds. In fact, a closer look at how the FSB has organized its work program indicates it would
not have trouble with the approach taken in this paper.
The function of the shadow-banking system is essentially to take loans that have significant
credit risk, are long-term and illiquid, and package them in such a way that they appear
riskless, short-term and liquid. This is done through a long chain of relationships that strip
away the risks, one by one, until the final product is ready.130 While this whole process need
not involve the traditional banking system, in fact, banks and shadow banks are closely linked.
Shadow banks and traditional banks interact continuously, not least through shadow-banking
entities providing wholesale funds to banks via the repo market. Moreover, many shadow-
banking entities are actually owned by traditional banks. 
With the definition of shadow banking somewhat unclear, measuring its size is also difficult. A
recent publication by Deloitte131 provides a range of estimates from $11 trillion to $65 trillion
(the latter being the FSB estimate). In part, the width of this range reflects the use of net versus
gross flows and different treatments of collateral (i.e., whether it is grossed-up for
rehypothecation or not). What is clearer is that the system grew very rapidly until 2007 and
grew more slowly through to 2013. Geographically, European shadow banking still seems to be
growing, although the shadow system has declined significantly in the United States. From
2012 onwards, there have been signs of renewed growth, particularly in Europe.
Before turning to the regulatory response, it is important to note that the shadow-banking
system has an upside as well as a downside. Thus, the purpose of regulation has to be to
preserve the former while reducing the latter. The first point is that shadow banking emerged to
meet a real need. Over the last few decades, there has been an explosion in asset-management 
129 Evidently, the Financial Stability Board definition is wider and this has certain advantages. First, it would also
encompass institutions and processes set up specifically for regulatory arbitrage. Consider, for example, what has
come to be called “shadow banking” in China. There has been a massive increase in the granting of credit through
investment trusts and other lending vehicles, which offer higher interest rates to depositors than the regulated rates
available at banks. While not suffering from crisis thus far, this source of credit expansion has been of increasing
concern to the Chinese authorities. Second, a broader definition would recognize that the particular character of
shadow banking might vary from cycle to cycle. The advantage of a narrower definition is that it allows more
specific solutions to more specific problems. 
130 For an excellent overview of this whole system, see: C. Claessens et al., “Shadow Banking: Economics and Policy,”
IMF Staff Discussion Note, December 4, 2012. An example of the chain of institutions involved would link the
following: house buyer to loan originator to loan warehouser to ABS pooler (broker dealer) to warehouser to CDO
creator to structured-investment-vehicle/conduit (issuer of asset-backed commercial paper) to money-market mutual
funds (MMF). Cash moves from the MMF to the house buyer, while obligations to repay flow the other way. Z.
Poszar et al. (“Shadow Banking,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report 458, July 2010) contend that the
links can be as few as three or as many as nine. Generally, the lower the quality of the underlying loan, the longer the
“risk-stripping” chain has to be. 
131 Deloitte Centre for Financial Services, “The Deloitte Shadow Banking Index,” Deloitte Consulting LLP, 2012.
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institutions and in the financial assets of corporations. All of these portfolios must include a
tranche of money or money-like assets (i.e., assets that are safe, short term and liquid). As well,
banks (especially in Europe) had need of AAA-rated assets that they could use to raise
wholesale funds from institutional investors and money-market funds. The development of
structured products effectively met these needs, while also providing riskier products for those
with a greater risk appetite. Further, the system provides static gains in efficiency in that
borrowers (especially ultimate borrowers) can borrow more cheaply. Finally, there are dynamic
benefits resulting from a vast array of analysts trying to design better products customized to
the needs of clients.
While the upside of the shadow-banking system was more apparent in the upswing of the
credit cycle, the downside revealed itself only later. Perhaps most importantly, it is now clear
that much of the impetus for shadow banking came from regulatory arbitrage. Very low policy
rates led to a sharp increase in the demand for credit, which, if granted, would have led to
shortages of regulatory capital and funding. The shadow-banking nexus helped avoid both
problems, at least for a time. However, when the crisis spread, a number of banks had (for
reputational reasons) to put many off-balance-sheet items back onto their balance sheet, with
serious implications both for capital adequacy and funding. Further, given possible systemic
implications for the banking system, the official sector had to extend its support to parts of the
shadow system as well.132
Further downsides emerged as it became clear the risk transformations promised by the shadow
system were only temporary, not permanent. The final assets produced by the system looked
safe, short term and liquid, but they were not. With respect to credit risk, the complexity and
opaqueness of the shadow-banking system eroded all forms of market discipline. In effect,
everyone in the long chain of relationships assumed that someone else was doing “due
diligence” and, in the end, no one was. In particular, the threat of tail events, inherent in the
use of many structured products,133 was completely ignored. The risks associated with maturity
transformation also reappeared. Indeed, Singh134 argues convincingly that a system in which
longer-term assets are funded by short-term collateralized lending is significantly more
“procyclical” than traditional lending.135 As for the newly created products being liquid, the
system showed itself all too susceptible to funding “runs.” When depositors at money-market
funds started to fear losing part of their deposits (“breaking the buck”) the whole system
promptly collapsed. More recently, commentators have also raised the possibility of a similar
kind of run involving scarce collateral.
132 For example, broker dealers got access to discount facilities at the Federal Reserve, AIG’s derivates business was
supported, and government guarantees were given to depositors at MMFs.
133 See footnote 78 above for an analysis. For warnings on this front, see: R. Rajan, “Has Financial Development made
the World Riskier?” (presented at “The Greenspan Era: Lessons for the Future” symposium, sponsored by the Federal
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Jackson Hole, Wyoming, August 25–27, 2005). Even self-discipline disappeared as
many big banks bought structured products with AAA ratings that, in the end, proved toxic. See: G. Tett, Fool’s Gold
(London: Little Brown, 2009). Finally, it is worth noting that many of these products were deemed riskless because
they were insured by monoline insurers, and sometimes by others (like AIG). Little if any attention was paid to
whether the insuring firm actually had the capacity to make good on the coverage promised.
134 M. Singh, "Velocity of pledged collateral: Analysis and implications," IMF Working Paper 11/256, 2012.
135 As asset prices rise, there is more collateral, haircuts get smaller, the velocity of turnover rises, and new kinds of
collateral become acceptable. In the downswing, this all goes into reverse. 
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Finally, the crisis drew attention to two other problems. First, much of the shadow-banking
business is international. In particular, European banks became heavily dependent on dollar
funding from U.S. money-market funds (MMFs) to finance heavy investments in U.S. dollar
assets. When the run on MMFs began, the access to these dollar funds suddenly disappeared.136
In the end, the U.S. Federal Reserve (and other central banks) had to reopen swap lines to
make funding available in various currencies. Second, with the growth of the shadow-banking
system, collateral management has become much more important. However, there are only a
limited number of firms providing such services and, partially as a result, all of them have been
designated by the FSB as G-SIFIs. Moreover, for tri-party repos, which have also been
growing in importance, only two Wall Street firms provide such services. In short, the
expansion of shadow banking may actually have worsened the “too big to fail” problem. 
What has been the official response? In Europe, the EU recently approved a new Directive on
Alternative Fund Managers that introduces official capital and reporting requirements. The
European Commission in September 2013 proposed tough new regulations for MMFs that will
require funds promising “no loss” investments (constant net-asset-value MMFs, or CNAVs)137
to hold three-per-cent capital. New regulations will also seriously constrain the capacity of all
MMFs to undertake liquidity transformation. Initial reaction from the industry was that these
regulations would “kill off” the MMF business in Europe. A serious accounting impediment to
corporate treasuries simply switching funds to variable net-asset-value funds (VNAVs) is that
CNAVs are not treated as “cash.” Thus, they cannot be subtracted from gross debt to lower net-
debt figures. In the United States, similar proposals are also being considered with the industry
lobbying vigorously against them. 
The FSB also issued three documents for consultation in November 2012: an integrated
overview of policy recommendations, a policy framework for oversight and regulation of
shadow-banking entities (other than MMFs), and a policy framework addressing risks in
securities lending and repos. It subsequently issued a series of policy proposals in the
“Progress of Financial Reforms” letter, sent to G20 ministers and central bank governors.138
The FSB proposes enhanced monitoring of the system, viewed very broadly, with a special
focus on innovative and potentially risky developments. However, when it comes to policy
prescriptions, the FSB makes recommendations with respect to five specific areas where
systemic risk-mitigation is thought possible.139 In particular, it wants: (1) to reduce spillover
effects between banks and shadow banks; (2) to reduce the susceptibility of MMFs to runs; (3)
to assess and align the incentives associated with securitization; (4) to dampen risks and
procyclical incentives associated with securities-financing transactions, such as repos and
securities lending; and (5) to assess and mitigate systemic risks posed by other shadow-banking
entities and activities.
136 P. McGuire and G. von Peter, “The US Dollar Shortage in Global Banking,” BIS Quarterly Review, March 2009.
137 Europe’s fixed-value MMFs (CNAVs) have about 500 billion euros in assets. Variable net-asset-value funds
(VNAVs) are even larger.
138 Financial Stability Board, “Progress of Financial Reforms,” Letter Sent to G20 Ministers and Central Bank
Governors, April 15, 2013.
139 The recommendations reflect the work of five separate working groups.
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The principal FSB recommendations all seem quite sensible: central clearing of repos, curbs on
rehypothecation, more stringent collateral valuations, and better liquidity management at
MMFs. Nevertheless, some issues remain. What will be the net influence on the size of the
shadow-banking system of tighter regulation of both banks and non-banks? Could the
interconnections between the banks and shadow banks actually increase as the opportunities for
regulatory arbitrage increase? Is the regulatory approach to dealer banks — which play a big
role in the shadow-banking system — adequate, given the “inherently fragile” nature of their
business model?140 Finally, could enhanced regulation in AMEs lead to a migration of the
shadow-banking business elsewhere (especially Asia, now deemed “the future”) with still
further unintended consequences?141 
This last comment raises a whole set of still broader concerns about innovative/adaptive
responses by the financial system to enhanced regulation of all sorts. Consider, for example,
the Vickers proposal to “ring-fence” the investment-banking arm of big conglomerates in the
U.K. The authorities have explicitly said that they are concerned these proposals might be
“gamed” and they have threatened complete legal separation should this happen.142 Another
example of an innovative response to new regulation has been the creation of new instruments,
such as “callable” paper to be issued by U.S. municipalities, to reduce the impact on banks of
new liquidity requirements. Other examples will surely follow. 
It is not clear that any regulatory authority has yet come to grips with the reality of continuous
innovative adaptation to regulatory change, which is a typical characteristic of complex
adaptive systems. The suggestions made by Andrew Haldane in this vein143 clearly need to be
treated seriously. First, it is not at all clear that complexity in the system itself is best met with
still more complex regulation. It will be evaded or have unintended consequences. Second,
relying more on regulatory principles, focusing on the “spirit of the law,” rather than on still
more detailed regulation, would seem to have much to recommend it in such circumstances.
Third, there would seem to be a need for regular updating of legislation and regulation to keep
pace with endogenous innovation.
140 See: Claessens et al., “Shadow Banking.”
141 Oliver Wyman, “The Financial Crisis of 2015: an Avoidable History,” in “State of the Financial Services Industry”
2011,
http://www.oliverwyman.com/media/OW_EN_FS_Publ_2011_State_of_Financial_Services_2011_US_Web.pdf.
142 Whether they would so act, given the continuing presence of universal banks elsewhere, remains to be seen. In
continental Europe and Japan, universal banks have existed (it is said) “forever,” and this seems unlikely to change in
the near future. In the U.S., as noted above, a bill has recently been introduced in the Senate to bring back aspects of
the Glass-Steagall Act. 
143 Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee.” The point is also made by Claessens et al., “Shadow Banking.”
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Prudential regulation of insurance companies and pension funds
The business models for insurance companies and pension funds are very different from banks.
Banks borrow short and lend long. The principal risks they face are losses in the value of their
assets (threatening insolvency) and difficulties in attracting funding. In contrast, insurance
companies and pension funds receive stable revenues up front (premiums and pension
contributions respectively), and then have to pay out on contingent contracts extending over
very long time periods. For such entities, the principal risks are on the liability side of the
balance sheet, though for life insurance companies and pension funds, the risks concerning
assets also remain substantial. Given these different risks, it is not surprising that the
preoccupations of the prudential regulators in these different financial sectors have also been
quite different. Further, absent any crisis in the insurance and pension industries in recent years
to match that in the banking sector, regulatory change has been much more stable and, indeed,
slower moving. 
The principal preoccupation of the insurance industry in recent years has been the
implementation of the Insurance Core Principles (ICP) promulgated by the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) in 2011.144 Twenty-six high-level principles are
laid out to ensure the insurance sector is financially sound and that there is an adequate level of
policyholder protection. Arguably, however, the three key elements are the following. First,
ICP suggests focusing on a group-wide evaluation of risks, using economic-based evaluations
of the value of assets and liabilities. Second, it requires minimum capital and solvency
requirements and “ladders” of supervisory intervention, ending with resolution and closure.
Third, it points out the need to develop a full-fledged “Enterprise Risk Management
Framework.” 
While insurance companies and pension funds in advanced market economies have been
significantly affected by the ICP, many of them had already been aspiring to “best practices” in
the industry. The greatest effect may then be felt in emerging market economies, whose
regulatory officials recognize that their compliance with ICP will be evaluated under the IMF’s
Financial Sector Assessment Program. Further, many companies in EMEs are part of broader
international groups that will be actively interested in importing best practices from elsewhere.
Finally, the earnings of insurance companies and pension funds everywhere are under pressure,
given the environment of very low interest rates. The need to re-evaluate business lines, to
establish whether the risk being run is worth it, is another motivation to implement ICP.
Measures to implement the Solvency ll Directive in Europe provide some insight into the pros
and cons of an ICP-consistent regulatory regime, as well as of Solvency ll itself. As noted
above, the regime has a three-“pillar” foundation, which is broadly based on Basel lll.145 As
with Basel lll, the calculation of the amount of required capital has been the most controversial. 
144 International Association of Insurance Supervisors, “Insurance and Financial Stability,” November 2011. For some
detailed country analysis of recent regulatory changes and the influence of ICP, see: Financial Services, KPMG,
“Evolving Insurance Regulation,” March 2013.
145 There remain many material differences between the two regimes. See: N. Gatzert and H. Wesker, “A Comparative
Assessment of Basel l/lll and Solvency ll,” The Geneva Papers, IASIE 37, 2012; and A. Al-Darwish et al., “Possible
Unintended Consequences of Basel lll and Solvency II,” IMF Working Paper 187, 2011.
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The amount of capital required should ensure solvency over a period one year ahead, with a
probability of 99.5 per cent. Unlike Basel lll, where risks (e.g., market, credit, liquidity and
operational) are considered additively, Solvency ll attempts to calculate the totality of these
risks, thus considering their interactions as well. This characteristic of the calculation, together
with the use of economic-based evaluations of the values of assets and liabilities, has led to
enormous complexity.146 Haldane’s concerns about “over-fitting” would seem to apply in
spades here. Moreover, given the very long maturity structure of the assets and liabilities, the
calculations of required capital can be very sensitive to relatively small changes in assumptions
about discount rates in particular.147 In fact, such issues have required five quantitative impact
studies to date (the last in March of 2013) and the postponement of Solvency ll to a date still to
be determined.148
A related feature is that calculations of profit and loss under this proposed system would likely
be much more variable than in the past. Various proposals, some on the asset side and some on
the liability side, have been proposed to mitigate this and related problems.149 The fear raised
by many is that this increased volatility of profits, together with the significant costs associated
with the practical application of Solvency ll,150 could raise the cost of capital for many
insurance companies. The implication would be that some insurance products would become
more expensive, while others might be withdrawn altogether. 
A further source of concern related to this volatility would be an increased tendency to
“procyclicality” on the part of the insurance industry. One problem might be a widening of risk
spreads on assets, implying losses in the downswing of the cycle. This might lead, in turn, to
attempts to constrain losses and thus “procyclicality.” This tendency would be exacerbated if
“risk-free” rates were falling as well, since the average duration of insurance liabilities tends to
exceed that of assets. Finally, if the regulatory regime encouraged many insurers to react
similarly, rather than idiosyncratically, as in the past, “procyclicality” would be further
enhanced. Since the insurance industry has typically absorbed volatility, rather than creating it,
this would be a step backwards for the financial system as a whole.151 A recurrent theme in the
regulatory literature is that proposed reforms in one sector give too little emphasis to the
effects on other financial sectors.
146 The guidebook for calculating capital requirements under Basel lll is 100 pages long, while for Solvency ll, it is
apparently more than 400 pages.
147 In addition, the impact on capital requirements of an increase in the probability threshold (say from 99.5 per cent to
99.6 per cent, versus from 99.75 per cent to 99.85 per cent) also rises exponentially. See: B. Pfister, “The More
Underlying Capital, the Greater the Financial and Societal Stability,” Insurance and Finance Newsletter, SC 13, The
Geneva Association, March 2012. Pfister makes the point that the only way to totally avoid crises is to shut the
industry down. This raises starkly the tradeoff between safety and efficiency.
148 For a discussion of the currently “live” issues, see: Morgan Stanley and Oliver Wyman, “Solvency ll: The Long and
Winding Road,” Morgan Stanley Blue Paper 23, March 2013.
149 Some of these proposed solutions require the agreement of accounting bodies like the IAB and FASB, which is an
added complication. For an overview of some of these mitigation approaches, see: J. Daniellson et al.,
“Countercyclical Regulation in Solvency ll,” VoxEu.org, June 23, 2012.
150 The Financial Stability Authority has estimated the upfront costs for U.K. insurers would be around 2 billion pounds
and a further 250 million pounds a year for compliance. See The Economist, “From Brussels with Shove,” April 7,
2012. A deputy governor of the Bank of England recently declared that both the Bank of England and the FSA were
“dismayed” at these costs. See: B. Masters, “Insurers Warned on Shadow Banking,” Financial Times, March 11,
2012.
151 Oliver Wyman, “Insurance Viewed from the Outside: Contributing to Financial Stability,” Insurance and Finance 9,
The Geneva Association, February 2012.
33
Because Solvency ll, is based on risk weights, like Basel lll, the new system could also affect
the allocation of funds as well.152 In particular, there is concern that the risk weights will
discourage equity investments and longer-term asset-holdings. The former might be a threat to
profits and solvency going forward. The latter might impede insurance companies from making
the longer-term investments (especially in infrastructure) that seem increasingly in demand in
well-functioning societies.153 Finally, some have raised the possibility that insurance
companies, traditionally a major source of longer-term funds to the banking system, will be
dissuaded from doing so.154 Since longer-term funding for banks has emerged as a serious
problem in its own right, the consequences of this could be material. In contrast, it must be
noted that careful empirical work by Höring155 indicates that these concerns are groundless. He
concludes that the current Standard and Poor’s ratings model requires 68-per-cent more capital
than the standard (Solvency ll) model for the same market risks. Thus, Solvency ll would not
be expected to influence significantly the insurance companies’ investment strategies.
However, whether this will prove a definitive finding must remain open to question.
Basel III (as Basel l) is intended to provide regulatory guidance for internationally active
banks. In contrast, there has until recently been no similar guidance for internationally active
insurance companies. For a while, it was hoped that Solvency ll might be adopted outside
Europe as well, thus leading to a de facto harmonization. However, given the difficulties just
described, this no longer seems likely. Further, while there are both differences and similarities
between the proposed European and actual U.S. regulatory regimes (e.g., both have risk-based
capital requirements), there seems to be no appetite for convergence.156 In part, this seems due
to American commentators feeling their state-based regulation (while divergent) is “mature and
robust,” while they see European initiatives as very much “work in progress.”
In response to these challenges, and the need for greater cross-border co-operation among
supervisors, the IAIS recently initiated ComFram, the Common Framework for the Supervision
of Internationally Active Insurance Groups (IAIG). ComFram is built upon the high-level
principles found in the ICP, but expands upon them to reflect not only the international
dimension, but also the added complexity of the business being done by large firms.157 It is not
in any way compulsory, but invites firms to take a group-wide view of risks and opportunities.
ComFram is currently undergoing development with a view to field-testing late in 2013 and
formal adoption in 2018. It is hoped that implementation will follow.
152 For an overview, see: Committee on the Global Financial System, “Fixed Income Strategies of Insurance Companies
and Pension Funds,” CGFS Papers 44, 2011. Also the literature review in D. Höring, “Will Solvency ll Market Risk
Requirements Bite? The Impact of Solvency ll on Issuer’s Asset Allocations,” The Geneva Papers 38 (July 2013). 
153 For recent recommendations in this area, see: Group of Thirty, “Long Term Finance and Economic Growth,”
Working Group on Long-Term Finance, 2013; and McKinsey Infrastructure Practice, “Infrastructure Productivity:
How to save $1 Trillion a Year,” McKinsey Global Institute, January 2013.
154 P. Jenkins and T. Braithwaite, “Rule Book Casts Shadow over Banking Recovery,” Financial Times, January 25,
2013. The CEO of Prudential (U.K.) has been quoted as saying “The insurance industry is (traditionally) the biggest
investor in the banking industry but Solvency ll says we can’t invest in banks.” 
155 Höring, “Will Solvency ll Market Risk.”
156 See: KPMG, “Evolving Insurance.” In October 2012 there was a first meeting of the EU-US Dialogue on Insurance
Regulation, which identified “key communalities” and “key differences.” The KPMG paper notes: “Disappointingly,
the paper provides (these) two main observations, without offering a firm commitment to change” (page 7). See also:
L. Woodall, “Deadlock,” Risk, April 15, 2013. The potential importance of this issue is underlined by the recognition
that Basel l was triggered by the agreement of the U.S. and U.K. regulators to move ahead jointly, thus effectively
forcing smaller players to go along as well. See: Silber, Volcker.
157 For documentation, see: International Association of Insurance Supervisors, “Some Frequently Asked Questions for
the IAIS Common Framework of the Supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups,” April 4, 2013.
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The IAIS has been at pains to stress that, while all systemically important insurance groups
will likely be global firms, not all global insurance firms are systemically important.158 Indeed,
the single most important effort made by the insurance industry in recent years has been to
provide evidence that the industry should not be thought of as a source of systemic concerns,
either globally or in individual markets.159 The motivation is obvious: namely, insurers wish to
avoid capital surcharges for SIFIs. In a nutshell, they argue that the expected loss from a crisis
originating in the insurance sector would be very low because both the probability of a sudden
crisis and the losses given a crisis would be very low. A recent study160 has compared the
“systemic“ properties of 28 systemically important banks and 28 of the largest global insurers,
using 17 criteria suggested by the FSB and the IAIS. The insurance companies score far lower
than the banks. Indeed, they all score significantly lower than three banks that were originally
classified as SIFIs, but then removed from the list as not being systemic enough.
With respect to the probability of crisis, industry representatives note that there has not been
such a systemic crisis in the insurance sector in the last hundred years. Far from being engaged
in a maturity-transformation business (like banks), which could leave insurance companies
subject to liquidity runs, their premiums are prepaid and their liabilities are generally of longer
term than their assets. Further, the industry spontaneously builds reserves during good times161
to have them available when circumstances worsen. With respect to losses given a crisis, there
is little prospect of the crisis spreading because (apart from the link via reinsurers) most
insurance conglomerates have few bilateral links with other such companies. As well,
resolution procedures for insurance companies tend to be well defined and there is also plenty
of time to detect problems and to deal with them. Finally, when companies fail, there is
invariably sufficient capacity in the system for their products to be easily replaced.
The IAIS has agreed with these arguments that “traditional” insurance activities are unlikely to
cause or amplify systemic risks in the financial sector.162 However, in light of the earlier
problems at AIG, both they and the industry accept that non-traditional, non-insurance (NTNI)
lines of business could pose problems. In spite of the judgment by the IAIS about “traditional”
insurance, the FSB announced in mid-July 2013 that nine large insurance groups would be
classified as SIFIs and would be subject to both tighter supervision and the need to provide
“living wills.”163 However, as with banks, exactly how this supervision would be done on a
cross-border basis remains to be determined.
158 For a good overview, see: KPMG, “Evolving Insurance.”
159 For a seminal piece from the industry see: The Geneva Association, “Insurance and Resolution in Light of the
Systemic Risk Debate,” February 2012. The FSB made the original distinction between global SIFIs (G-SIFIs) and
domestic SIFIs (D-SIFIs). 
160 J. H. Patrick, “Cross Industry Analysis of 28 G-SIBs vs. 28 Insurers: Comparison of Systemic Risk Indicators,” The
Geneva Institute, Economist Conference, London, February 12, 2013.
161 In the industry jargon, “hard times” are periods when demand is high for insurance products (a seller’s market) and
the industry can charge more for the services it provides. These cycles are generally not highly correlated with the
economic cycle. See: E. Baranoff, “Financial Stability in Insurance: A Built-In Resilience Mechanism,” Editorial,
Insurance and Finance Newsletter, the Geneva Institute, February 9, 2012.
162 See: International Association of Insurance Supervisors, “Insurance and Financial”; and International Association of
Insurance Supervisors, “Reinsurance and Financial Stability,” July 19, 2012.
163 In the U.S., AIG and GE Capital have already been designated as systemically important financial institutions by the
U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council. What exactly this will entail remains to be determined.
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As for supplementary capital requirements for insurance SIFIs, the IAIS has suggested that
NTNIs should be segregated into separate businesses and any capital surcharge should be
similarly restricted. However, they admit that defining NTNIs might not be easy.164 The FSB
has recently agreed with this proposal, and has further encouraged such segregation by noting
that firms that fail to segregate will have to face higher capital requirements over the entire
balance sheet. The determination of precise capital surcharges is still very much work in
progress.165
Pension funds played an even more limited role than did insurance companies in initiating and
propagating the continuing economic and financial crisis. Nevertheless, they might still be
affected by some of the regulatory changes proposed in light of the crisis. An important
European initiative has been to consider imposing a Solvency ll-type regime on defined-benefit
pension funds across Europe. An initial quantitative-impact study has already been carried
out166 and shows that, in a large number of European countries, the average defined-benefit
pension fund is significantly underwater. Not surprisingly, national pension regulators (in the
U.K., the Netherlands, Germany, Ireland and Belgium) have all expressed their unwillingness
to import these European standards, and the European Commission has recently said it will
pursue them no further. It bears noting, however, that the use of national methodologies also
shows that many defined-benefit pension funds in Europe, as well as in Canada and the United
States, are deeply underfunded.167
The European initiative seems likely to focus more attention onto this long-neglected topic of
underfunding, as will the prospects of bond rates staying low for a long time.168 At one extreme
are suggestions that pension schemes should rely on more flexible accounting that dispenses
with the need for discounting altogether.169 Critics, of course, will see this as another form of
forbearance. At another extreme, company sponsors could be forced into making good the
pension shortfall. At the least, this would be another major constraint on fixed capital
investment at a time when such investment is greatly needed to support the advanced market
economies. At worst, it would lead to widespread corporate bankruptcies, implying workers
would lose both their jobs and their pensions. Evidently, some middle road will be required to
deal with this current problem before regulatory steps can be taken to reduce the risk of this
happening again.
164 Insurance Regulation, “Regulators Balk at G20 Insurer Systemic Risk Plan,” Global Risk Regulator, January 15,
2013.
165 International Association of Insurance Supervisors, “Proposed Topic for Discussion during the FSC Session with
Observers on 20 March in Basel,” Mimeo, 2013.
166 The study was undertaken by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority at the request of the
European Commission. Strict assumptions about the discount rate and the need for capital buffers contribute to
pushing up the shortfall.
167 A study by Towers Watson (“Global Pension Assets Study 2013,” 2013) shows that, at the end of 2012, 55 per cent
of global pension assets were in defined-benefit schemes. The ratios are much higher for Canada (96 per cent), Japan
(98 per cent), the Netherlands (94 per cent) and the U.K. (74 per cent).
168 Some other policy changes might also affect pension funds adversely. A proposed financial-transactions tax in
Europe could be costly, as could regulations to force derivatives trading onto exchanges. The exchanges are very
likely to ask for collateral that pension funds do not have. 
169 E. Kelleher, “Push for More Flexible Accounting,” Financial Times, March 4, 2013.
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Possible implications for the institutional structure for governance
There are many issues to be addressed to ensure the prudent regulation of financial institutions.
Not least is the issue of how regulation and supervision should be organized institutionally. The
IMF170 recently looked at national practices around the world. It identified seven major models
for overseeing financial regulation, as well as a whole host of variants. Each seemed, to the
IMF, to be very much an accident of history, rather than an attempt to apply agreed-upon
principles. That said, as the interconnections between markets and financial institutions became
more evident as financial liberalization proceeded, the IMF did identify a tendency towards the
unification of the regulatory agencies involved. In this process, central banks in a number of
countries saw their responsibility for prudential oversight somewhat diminished. 
What needs to be asked is whether some principles might be identified to guide the adoption of
an institutional structure for prudential regulation, including macro-prudential regulation.
Against the background of financial globalization, some have suggested171 the need for a global
super-regulator. Given the great need for cross-border co-operation to harmonize reporting, and
to aid in recovery and resolution issues, this suggestion has clear merit at the level of principle.
However, there is currently virtually no support for such an approach among national
politicians and officials. That said, the crisis has led to a serious discussion within the eurozone
area of the need for a banking union. This would include common deposit insurance, common
resolution procedures and unified banking supervision. Indeed, the process of setting up
supervisory capacity at the European Central Bank is already well advanced. Nevertheless, the
ongoing debate about the relative mandates of the ECB and national regulatory authorities
shows clearly the unwillingness of many European countries to give up what they have always
thought of as sovereign powers. It will take significantly more progress before Europe can be
held up as a model for the rest of the world in the regulatory area.
The search for organizational principles must therefore be conducted at the national level. I
have elsewhere suggested172 that there are criteria for assigning mandates and powers to
existing national institutions to ensure effective policy decisions in the pursuit of macro-
prudential objectives. I defined these as the “should, could and would” criteria. The “should”
criterion asks which institution has the expertise to identify what needs to be done in the
regulatory sphere, including the use of macro-prudential measures. The “could” criterion asks
which institution currently has, or should be assigned, the needed legislative powers to act.
Finally, there is the “would“ criterion: Which institution would seem most likely to have the
will to act when such action will be resolutely opposed by many self-interested groups?
Recognizing the pervasive influence of inertia, lobbying and justified uncertainty about the
implications (both expected and unexpected) of policy action, the importance of this last
criterion cannot be over-emphasized. 
170 IMF (2011) “Towards effective macroprudential monetary frameworks: an assessment of stylized institutional
models.”
171 See: J. Eatwell and L. Taylor, “Global Finance at Risk: the Case for International Regulation,” New School for Social
Research, 2000; and L. Clancy, “A Rallying Cry for Uniform Regulation,” Risk, March 19, 2013. Clancy reports on
the views of David Wright of IOSCO.
172 W. R. White, “Macro Prudential Regulatory Policies: the New Road to Financial Stability?” in “Macro Prudential
Regulatory Policies Conference, Organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago,” World Scientific Publishing
Company, Singapore, 2012.
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Application of these three criteria, especially the first and third, would seem to give an
important role to central banks in the pursuit of systemic stability in the financial sector.
Broadly stated, the more the objective of regulatory policy moves in the direction of systemic
stability, the greater should be the role played by central banks in regulating institutions whose
activities seem likely to have systemic implications. This conclusion is further strengthened if it
is agreed that monetary policy also has a role to play in the pursuit of financial stability.173
Indeed, some would even argue that, in the limit, there is no valid distinction between pursuing
price stability and pursuing financial stability.174 They are two sides of the same
macroeconomic coin. 
It is important to stress that there is currently no consensus on the underlying macroeconomic
analytics. In particular, there is no consensus on whether monetary policy should support
macro-prudential policies in leading against the credit cycle and systemic instability. Therefore,
there is no consensus on the implications for institutional structure. To illustrate the resulting
diversity, the U.S. has set up the Financial Stability Oversight Council made up of the heads of
various regulatory agencies and chaired by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. In Europe, the
European Systemic Risk Board is made up of supervisors and central bankers, and is chaired by
the president of the ECB. In the U.K., all these prudential functions have been given to the
Bank of England, which now has two internal committees (the Monetary Policy Committee and
the Financial Policy Committee) both headed by the governor. In the eurozone, banking
supervisory oversight has recently been given to the ECB, but there is to be a strict separation
(and “firewalls”) from the ECB’s monetary-policy function. Evidently, what has been done in
practice reflects a wide range of divergent “beliefs,” not all of which can be well founded. 
There might, however, be other areas where a broader consensus could be arrived at. First, to
avoid central banks becoming overly “powerful” and unnecessarily embroiled in political
decisions, “micro-prudential supervision” and “conduct of business” functions should likely be
in another institution. This said, when it comes to the use of instrument of all sorts for macro-
prudential purposes, some institution (likely the central bank) must have the power to make
binding decisions. Levels of central bank accountability must, of course, be raised
commensurately. Second, in the event of a “bust” after a “boom,” those responsible should be
held accountable. This would, of course, be a marked change from current practice. And third,
in a post-boom crisis, institutional dominance should likely pass to Treasuries given the likely
need for committing significant amounts of taxpayers’ money in such circumstances. 
173 See: International Monetary Fund, “The Interaction of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies,” January 19, 2013.
174 D. Laidler (“Financial Stability, Monetarism and the Wicksell Connection,” University of Western Ontario, Working
Paper 2007-3, 2007: 8) says, “These (inflation-control) regimes, in short, have a long intellectual prehistory during
which the stabilization of inflation was by and large not treated as a policy goal separate and distinct from mitigating
the cycle and maintaining financial system stability, but as a key means of promoting precisely these ends.”
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ESTIMATING THE BUILDUP OF FINANCIAL RISKS
A large part of “modern” regulation has to do with estimating the buildup of risks within
individual firms and across the financial system as a whole. Recent experience has taught us
that both regulators and bankers are not as good at this as might be desired. A number of
shortcomings have been identified, but there continues to be differing views in different
jurisdictions (and often within jurisdictions) as to what precisely needs to be done to remedy
those deficiencies. These issues (what “should” be done to mitigate risks) are logically separate
from issues having to do with effective supervision (the “can” and “would” issues identified
above). Unfortunately, the issue of effective supervision is beyond the scope of this paper.175 
A first problem with estimating the buildup of risks has to do with accounting standards. In
spite of immense efforts, significant accounting differences still exist between the international
accounting standards laid out by the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and
the GAAP standards that apply in the United States. Different approaches, especially with
respect to the netting of derivative contracts, also make it difficult to make international
comparisons between banks. However, the fact of differences is less significant than the
absence of agreement about the best way to do things. The biggest conceptual issue holding
back standardization of accounting standards affecting banks seems to be differences of view
about the benefits (or, perhaps, the costs) of mark-to-market and “fair value” accounting. As
well, there is a sense that current accounting standards are not granular enough. Thus, they
permit banks to present their accounts in such an opaque way that they remain virtual “black
boxes.”176 As for insurance companies, the process of standardization has only begun.
KPMG177 summed up the issue well. It states that “currently financial statements can be
unrepresentative and confusing,” though it then maps out existing plans to improve the
situation over the next five years.
A second problem has to do with auditing standards, which seem universally too low. All of the
financial firms that have gotten into trouble over the last few years had recently been audited
and received good marks. In sum, audits appear to be very costly but provide little useful
information. A particular source of concern has been the performance of auditing firms in
emerging market countries — firms that are, in principle, linked to larger firms in advanced
market countries. Nevertheless, they seem, in practice, to receive little oversight with respect to
quality standards. Again, there is a proposed agenda for change, which includes measures to
encourage audits by firms other than the “big four” and more frequent rotation among auditing
firms. 
175 H. Caruana (“Financial Stability: Ten Questions and About Seven Answers” (paper presented at the 50th Anniversary
Symposium Conference Organized by the Reserve Bank of Australia, Sydney, Australia, February 9, 2010)) notes
that the effectiveness of supervision across countries varies widely. In part, this may reflect different philosophical
approaches: a “light touch” approach based on general principles, versus a strict, rules-based approach. Each has its
shortcomings. A “light touch” approach will be inadequate if assumptions about ethical behaviour are routinely
violated. At the same time, a rules-based approach invites evasion and will always lag behind ongoing innovation.
176 See: F. Partnoy and J. Eisinger, “What’s Inside America’s Banks?” The Atlantic, January/February 2013.
177 KPMG, “Evolving Insurance.”
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A third problem, closely related to the first two, has to do with the broader issue of transparency.
If financial institutions were to be more explicit about their business models and the associated
risks, as well as the assumptions underlying the calculations feeding into their risk calculations,
this would go a long way to opening the “black box.” The Report of the Enhanced Disclosure
Task Force,178 a private-sector initiative supported by the FSB, at least indicates some good
intentions. These good intentions could be supported by a realization that it is also in the banks’
own interests to follow through with action. Recall that uncertainty about exposures seems to
have been an important element in the seizing up of the inter-bank market after the failure of
Lehman Brothers in 2008. Note, further, that many large banks have market values for their
equity well below book values. In part, this reflects the influence of such uncertainty.
Improvements to data have also moved much higher up the agenda of the official sector, not
least, data on real-time counter-party exposures.179 Against the backdrop of the crisis, the G20
has strongly supported efforts to improve the availability and quality of data for monitoring
growing risk exposures within the financial system, and a great deal of progress has been
made.180 That said, there remains significant shortcomings, particularly with respect to
consolidated (global) data for individual banks.181 Moreover, the complexity of risk-
management processes, and the variety of inter-firm relationships through which risk exposures
are transferred, could imply a need for data that is almost infinite. An evident danger, absent all
the data required, is that costly efforts are made to collect data that, in the end, proves
impossible to interpret.182
A fourth problem has to do with the quality of the modeling of risk exposures in the financial
sector. As Borio puts it:183 “The main reason why crises occur is not lack of statistics but the
failure to interpret them properly and take remedial action.” Nevertheless, certain positive 
178 Enhanced Disclosure Task Force, “Enhancing the Risk Disclosures of Banks,” October 29, 2012.
179 The CGFS of the BIS tried in the late 1990s to substantially enhance such data collection (the Bédeneau Group), but
this was strongly resisted by the biggest countries. The arguments used were that such data collection would reveal
proprietary trading strategies and would be too costly. As well, national central banks might well have been trying to
protect their own national “champions.” Note that real-time exposure data would not only be of use for crisis
prevention but also for crisis management.  
180 See Financial Stability Board, “The Financial Crisis,” for an update. Monitoring risk exposures within the financial
system is a different exercise from determining when to begin “leaning” against credit bubbles likely to have
significant macroeconomic costs. As recorded in Borio and Drehman (“Towards an Operational”), joint deviations of
credit and property prices from longer-term trends appear to have significant predictive power. Unfortunately, data
series on property prices are very poor in most countries.  
181 See: C. Borio, “The Great Financial Crisis: Setting Priorities for New Statistics,” Bank for International Settlements
Working Paper 408, April 2013. Consolidated data for individual banks (both on-balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet;
both domestic and international) would shed light on exposures to various risks, including funding risks. A very
useful complement would be comparable income information, especially about the sources of profits. Once
completed, such data would allow drilling down to get other useful information about inter-office exposures and
bilateral exposures. In addition, methodologies and processes developed for banks might then be extended to
“shadow banks” and perhaps other financial institutions.
182 This is less applicable to more highly aggregated data. In contrast, one of the purposes of forcing OTC derivatives to
be exchange traded is that the information about each such trade can be consolidated at trade depositories. However,
according to the FSB, only a limited number of depositories worldwide actually have the capacity to collect
information on counter-party exposure (gross and net) along with information about collateralization and the
character of the legal agreements governing the trade. Unfortunately, having such information is essential for
evaluating risk exposure, as indicated in International Financing Review (2013), which records the views of market
professionals attending ISDA’s 2013 annual meeting. 
183 Borio, “The Great Financial.”
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developments can be noted. A welcome development has been the increasing attention paid to
“risk maps,” which attempt to identify points of stress within the financial system.184 Network
analysis seems to provide an especially promising source of insight in this regard.185 As a
stylized fact, increases in cross-border lending, especially by banks, appear to have strong
predictive capacities for subsequent crises. Bruno and Shin186 also emphasize the dangers
associated with a rising dependence by banks on wholesale funding. 
On the other hand, less positive developments concerning modeling can also be noted. First,
Haldane187 makes a convincing case that the risk weights produced by complex “internal
models” are inherently, extremely unreliable. The more complex the portfolio and the shorter
the available data set, the greater the danger of over-fitting and spurious results. In contrast,
Sands recognizes shortcomings but suggests important improvements are still possible.188
Second, a number of commentators have suggested that many of the technical assumptions
underlying the Basel methodology are seriously flawed.189 Third, those trying to predict
financial crises using market-generated price data have been gravely disappointed. At best,
market indicators (e.g., credit spreads and the Vix) are coincident indicators of crises. At worst,
such indicators are positively misleading in that the market indicators of risk go down just as
the underlying risks are really going up.190 Third, models used by individual banks to assess
capital requirements under the Advanced Assessment Regime under Basel II have been found
by the Basel committee to give wildly different results for both the trading book and the
banking book.191 This could lead to some banks being asked to revert to use of the standardized
methodology, or to the imposition of capital floors.192 Interestingly, a substantial proportion of
the differences in the trading book can be explained by differing requirements for calculating
“risk weights” put down by national regulators themselves. This has raised further concerns
about the whole “risk weight” methodology, as well as the real commitment of supervisors to a
“level playing field” internationally. 
184 See, for example: O. Issing et al., “New Financial Order: Recommendations by the Issing Committee,” Center for
Financial Studies, White Paper 2, April 2, 2009; J. P. Krahnen, “A Global Risk Map: Is it Feasible? How to Do It?”
(presented at Finance Focus Breakfast, Bruegel Institute, Brussels, 2010); and S. Cecchetti, I. Fender and P.
McGuire, “Towards a Global Risk Map,” Bank for International Settlements Working Paper 309, May 2010.
185 The BIS was an early entrant into this area. See: McGuire and von Peter, “The US Dollar Shortage”; and C. Upper,
“Simulation Methods to Assess the Danger of Contagion in Interbank Markets,” Bank for International Settlements
Working Paper 234, August 2001.
186 Bruno and Shin, “Capital Flows.”
187 Haldane, “The Dog and the Frisbee.”
188 Sands, “When it Comes to Banks.”
189 See, for example: M. Zanganeh and R. A. Jones, “Asset Correlation and Credit Quality: the Basel Assumption,”
Mimeo, BMO Financial Group and Simon Fraser University, August 2012. The Basel committee assumes that asset-
return correlations and default probabilities are negatively correlated on sovereign, corporate and banking exposures.
The authors rather contend they are positively correlated. See also T. Aubrey and G. Le Pera (“Improvements in the
Measure of Systemic Risks for Credit Portfolio Management,” Mimeo, Credit Capital Advisory, July 2013) who
fundamentally question the relevance of historical data in evaluating systemic risk going forward. Thus, value-at-risk
calculations give much more solace than they should. 
190 One important exception might be the ratio of book values and market values for the equity of banks.
191 See: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Report on the Regulatory Consistency of Risk Weighted Assets for
Market Risk,” January 31, 2013; and Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Progress Report.”
192 The Swedish authorities have done this for residential mortgages. By raising the minimum risk weight to 15 per cent,
they essentially tripled the capital requirement. The Norwegian Ministry of Finance has asked its banking supervisors to
consider a minimum risk weight of 35 per cent for residential mortgages. In both countries, household debt and house
prices are at record levels, and these policy prescriptions have been motivated by macroprudential considerations. 
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Finally, as Hellwig193 notes, stress tests still hold constant too many variables that would
change simultaneously in a crisis. Thus, stress tests fail to measure the full effects of systemic
events. As a result, they have repeatedly provided solace when no solace was due. Worse, there
have been growing concerns that the failure of stress tests to reveal underlying banking
fragilities might actually have been the purpose of the exercise. In Europe in particular, the
disconnect between benign stress tests and subsequent outcomes has been remarkable.194 Such
perceptions have also contributed to the widespread belief that European banks still have many
losses that have not yet been revealed, and this perception has clearly aggravated the eurozone
crisis. Against this background, the European Central Bank will face grave risks when it
conducts similar tests in the exercise of its new responsibilities. The tests will only be credible
if they can reveal some banks as being undercapitalized. However, absent a “Plan B” to resolve
such a problem,195 this will not be possible and the ECB’s reputation could suffer accordingly. 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER WORK
In recent years, both at the level of the nation-state and internationally, an extraordinary
amount of effort and resources has gone into drafting laws and regulations to prevent a
recurrence of the current crisis. The last progress report submitted by the FSB to the G20196
records welcome developments in a whole host of areas. Serious attempts are being made,
sometimes opposed by vigorous lobbying efforts, to address virtually all the questions raised
below. Nevertheless, a dispassionate observer would still harbour two sets of concerns. 
The first would be that the concern for crisis prevention has led to too little attention being
paid to resolving the current crisis. Short-term measures avoided disaster but, as described
above, compounded medium-term problems. In some regions, the “too big to fail” problem
worsened. In others, banks and the shadow-banking system remained for years too weak to
provide the loans needed for the early resumption of “strong, stable and balanced growth”
desired by the G20. This latter problem continues to plague Europe in particular.
The second concern would be that most of the measures proposed to ensure future financial
stability have a strong flavour of “more of the same”: more capital, more liquidity, more
supervisors and, above all, more detailed regulatory prescriptions. Many of the difficulties
associated with these individual initiatives have been described above. Perhaps even more
importantly, what continues to be missing is a willingness to approach the problem of financial
stability in an even more radical way. The rest of this paper identifies the most fundamental
issues pertaining to the prudential regulation of financial institutions. While posed as questions,
in order to motivate more research going forward, the author’s inclination is to answer most of
these questions in the affirmative. 
193 M. Hellwig, “Capital Regulation after the Crisis: Business as Usual?” Max Planck Institute for Research on
Collective Goods, 2010/31, 2010.
194 For example, stress tests conducted on the Irish banks, just prior to the collapse of the banking system, gave all the
Irish banks a clean bill of health.
195 A “Plan B” would likely require public-sector recapitalization, for which there are currently no adequate funds
available, or closure. As described above, the latter approach seems almost impossible in the European case.
196 Financial Stability Board, “FSB Reports to the G20 on Progress and Next Steps Towards Ending Too-Big-to-Fail,”
Press Release, September 2, 2013.
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Should we be clearer about the ultimate purpose of a financial system, and how it might be
structured to achieve that purpose? Avoiding financial instability, laudable as this might be, is
only a partial answer to this broader question of efficiency.
Should there be more explicit recognition of the financial sector (indeed the whole economy)
as a complex adaptive system? This implies greater “top down” attention to systemic issues as
opposed to “bottom up” attention to individual institutions and individual market failures. It
also implies recognition that the problem is largely uncertainty, not risk, and that simple
regulatory responses might generally be preferable to complex ones.197 Thirdly, it implies the
need for a constant regulatory response to what is likely to be constant innovation in response
to regulation itself, as well as other forces. Finally, it implies financial regulators might have a
lot to learn from other regulators of complex, adaptive systems
Closely related, should we pay more attention to the problem that Hayek referred to as the
“pretence of knowledge” when setting policies? We never know as much as we would like, and
therefore, policies can have unintended consequences. Collateral, for example, shifts risk in the
system rather than reducing it overall, and could make the system less stable not more. At the
philosophical level, how do we approach policy-making in the area of prudential regulation in
the face of pervasive uncertainty?
Should prudential regulation in pursuit of financial stability be pursued jointly with monetary
policy or independently? Since macro-prudential policies and monetary policies both affect the
real economy, as well as the financial sector, who should make what decisions?
Should the capital requirements standard for banks be even higher than mandated by Basel lll,
given how elusive a concept it is, how hard it is to measure, how easily it can be gamed
(weighted versus unweighted) and how quickly it can disappear in a crisis? How might these
problems associated with a reliance on capital standards be minimized? Is there a possibility
that regulatory standards might become “floors” in the eyes of the market? If so, how might
this tendency be minimized since it implies that capital (below the floor) could never be used
as a buffer (for unexpected losses) because such use would cause market panic?
Should relatively less emphasis be put on regulatory and supervisory discipline and relatively
more on self-discipline and market discipline? 
How might self-discipline (more prudent behaviour) be best improved? Should we roll back
the public safety net, re-establish bankers’ sense of “fiduciary responsibility” to their clients,
change compensation incentives to discourage “short-termism” and encourage value investing,
make legal redress (including prison) more threatening, restore unlimited liability, etc.? How
might these changes be practically carried out?
How might market discipline be improved? How can accounting and auditing be made more
useful to those who rely on these functions to exert market discipline? Does it really make
sense to use market-determined numbers (“fair value”) to value firms when the purpose of the
accounts is to inform the market? Are we collecting the right data from financial institutions
(“risk map” issues) and are we making them known to the market in the right way? 
197 As argued by Haldane (“The Dog and the Frisbee”).
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Should we show more willingness to change the structure of the financial system to make it
more stable? Should we be prepared to roll back globalization by insisting that foreign banks
act as branches not subsidiaries? Should we be prepared to roll back securitization and shadow
banking by reducing the (perhaps dangerous) role of collateral in the system? Should we be
prepared to roll back consolidation by breaking up SIFIs and by forbidding links between
commercial banks and investment banks? What about “narrow banking” and the Chicago
proposals (Henry Simons and Irving Fisher) from the 1930s?
Should there be greater recognition that different financial institutions have different business
models (banks are not insurance companies) and pose different threats to financial stability? If
so, different regulatory responses would seem required. 
Finally, with respect to identified shortcomings in the prudential regulatory prescriptions
identified above, could more research show us how they might be “tweaked” to improve their
effectiveness? In principle, the answer is yes. Nevertheless, there is the clear danger of just
replacing “more of the same” with “still more of the same.” In the end, the greatest benefit of
more research might be to call into question some of the fundamental assumptions motivating
the current policy agenda. This would close some doors but, hopefully, would open others. 
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disease
Stephen Gordon | September 2013
REDISTRIBUTION OF INCOME: POLICY DIRECTIONS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/redistribution-income-policy-directions
James Davies | August 2013
INCOME INEQUALITY AND INCOME TAXATION IN CANADA: TRENDS IN THE CENSUS 1980-2005
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/income-inequality-and-income-taxation-canada-trends-census-
1980-2005
Kevin Milligan | August 2013
INCOME INEQUALITY, REDISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/income-inequality-redistribution-and-economic-growth
Bev Dahlby and Ergete Ferede | August 2013
DIPLOMACY, GLOBALIZATION AND HETEROPOLARITY: THE CHALLENGE OF ADAPTATION
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/diplomacy-globalization-and-heteropolarity-challenge-adaptation
Daryl Copeland | August 2013
UNHEALTHY PRESSURE: HOW PHYSICIAN PAY DEMANDS PUT THE SQUEEZE ON PROVINCIAL HEALTH-CARE
BUDGETS
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/unhealthy-pressure-how-physician-pay-demands-put-squeeze-
provincial-health-care-budgets
Hugh M. Grant and Jeremiah Hurley | July 2013
TRENDS, PEAKS, AND TROUGHS: NATIONAL AND REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT CYCLES IN CANADA
http://policyschool.ucalgary.ca/?q=content/trends-peaks-and-troughs-national-and-regional-employment-
cycles-canada
Ronald Kneebone and Margarita Gres | July 2013
